Presidential Power of Pardon - A Critical Study by Khan, Mohd. Ali
PRESIDENTIAL POWER OF PARDON 
-A CRITICAL STUDY 
DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE fiEQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
Muittv of Hataisi 
BY 
iHoIib. m Hl^ an 
Under the Supervision of 
Mr. Shariful Hasan 
Resftor 
F A C U L T Y OF LAW 
ALI6ARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALI6ARH (1J4DIA) 
1988-89 
5 T3S ;2'3,2>S" 
I 
DS2335 
S h a r i f u l Hasan 
Reader 
FACULTY OF LAW 
_. rOff ce : 5764 Phones | _ _^,„ LRes. : 5519 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH-202 002 
Date 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
Th is i s t o c e r t i f y tha t Hr. nohammad A l i Khan of 
LL.N, ( f i n a l ) has completed h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n 
e n t i t l e d " P r e s i d e n t i a l Power of pardon : A C r i t i c a l 
Study" in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requi rements 
f o r t he auard of LL.I*!. degree under my s u p e r v i s i o n . 
I u i sh him a l l success. 
Superu i so r 
C O N T E N T S 
Acknowledgement 
Table of Cases 
INTBODUCTION 
CHAPTER I HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A) England 
B) The Law of Pardon before 
Cons t i t u t ion 
e ) Cons t i tuen t Assembly Debates 
12 - 31 
12 
21 
26 
CHAPTER I I SCOPE OP ARTICLE 72 
A) Meaning of Pardon e t c . 
B) Nature and Object of Pardon 
C) Pardon and Amnesty Dis t ingu ished 
32 - 72 
34 
37 
40 
CHAPTER I I I JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENT 
CHAPTER IV 
A) United S t a t e s J u d i c i a l A t t i t u d e 
B) Indian J u d i c i a l At t i tude 
C) Comparision of U.S. & Indian 
At t i t ude 
CONCLUSION 
73 - 105 
73 
82 
95 
106 - 114 
Bibl iography 
AG K N O W L E D G E M E N T 
I t i s a l l due to the Almighty Allah the Beneficient, the 
Merciful tha t I have "been able to complete my d i s sa r t a t ion and 
I bow my head before Him. 
I am deeply indebted and obliged to my learned and ski l ful 
supervisor Mr. Sharif ul Hasan, Reader in Law, who in spi te of his 
other business has given me the time in a generous and genial 
mood throughout t h i s work. 
I am beholden to my mother and brothers who have been 
helping me morally and material ly and have been waiting anxiously 
to see the r e su l t s of t h e i r s a c r i f i c e . 
I t i s my pleasant duty to express my sense of gra t i tude 
to Prof. Kr. Ghulam A. Khan, Chairman and Prof. Dr. M, Z. Siddiqi, 
Dean, Faculty of Law, for the i r scholar ly guidance. 
I wish to record my sincere obl igat ions to Prof. S.M. 
Hasan; Prof. V.S. Rekhi; Mr. M. Moshir Alam, Reader; Mr. Sarfaraz 
£han for t h e i r suggestions and encouragement. 
I am equally grateful to my friends namely Mr. Badar 
Ahmad, Mr. Murtaza A. Khan, Mr. Shoket A l i , Mr. Allauddin 
Tarique, Mr. Abdul Wahid and Mr. Mubarak Butt for the i r ass i s tance 
and especial ly to my fas t friend Mr. Mohammad As lam Khan who 
helped me giving suggestions r a t h e r leaving no comer untouched 
during the e n t i r e period. 
I am gra tefu l to toe s taff of Maulana Azad l i b r a ry , 
Indian Law I n s t i t u t e , New Delhi and Mr. Wajid Husain, 
Mr. Mohammad Abu Bakar Obaid of Law Library for the i r 
cooperat ion. 
I t i s a l so my moral duty to acknowledge the cooperation 
and i n t e r e s t of Mr. JLtaat Husain who has typed t h i s work 
excel lent ly in the e a r l i e s t possible t ime. 
MOHAMMAD ALI KHAN 
Department of Law 
Aligarh Muslim University 
Aligarh. UP, India . 
TABLE OP CASES 
Bachan Singh v . S ta te of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 465 
B a t e ' a caae 1606, 2 S ta t e T r i a l s 371 
Biddle v . Perovich (1926) 274 U .S . 71 L.ed . 
Burdick v . U.S. (1914) 236 U.S . 79 L.ed. 426 
Deputy I n s p e c t o r General of P o l i c e v . Raja Ram, AIR I960 AP 259 
Ex-Par te Grrossman, 69 L .ed . 527 
Ex-Par te Well , 15 L.ed . 421 a t 530 
Godden v . Ha les , 1686 I I S t a t e T r i a l s 1165 
Hay V. J u s t i c e s of Tov/er Div i s ion of London, 1890 24 QBD 561 
Kehar Singh v . Union of I n d i a , AIR 1989 SC 653 
King V. Hampden (1637) 3 S t a t e T r i a l 
K.M. Nanavat i v . S ta te of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 113 
Knote V. U . S . , 1877 24 L .ed . 42 
Kul jee t Singh v . L t . Governor of Delh i , 1981 SC 1572 
Maru Ram v . Union of Ind i a , AIR 1981 SCR 107 
Northen- S e c u r i t i e s Co. v . U .S . 
Re-Channugadu c a s e , 1954 SC C r i . L . J . 1370 Mad. 
Sa ra t Chandra Rabha v . Khagendragadkar Nath, 1961 2 SCR 133 . 
Sher Singh v . S t a t e of Punjab, 1983 AIR SC 465 
T.V.- Vatheeswaran v . S t a t e of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1983 SC 261 
U.S . V. Benz, 75 L. ed, 354 
U.S . V. Wilson, 8 L.ed . 643. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The pr inc ipa l forms of mit igat ion of punishment consist 
of pardons and commutations of sentences . Pardons are very 
ancient in o r ig in . To what extent pardons are found among 
p r imi t ive peoples can not be ascer ta ined , since the monographic 
s tud i e s of t h e i r ways of l i f e contain so l i t t l e coverage on an 
item of t h i s s o r t . According to Jensen 's researches, Hammurabi's 
aoD pardoned a s lave; king David i s reported to have used the 
pardoning power; the "assembled people" of Athens could remit 
p e n a l t i e s ; the Roman emperors exercised the pardoning power; 
clemency was used among the early Germanic Tribes and by the 
ear ly English king. In modem Bigland appl icat ions for pardon 
are reviewed and recommended by the Home Secretary 's of f ice , 
ac t ing for the king. The pardoning power in the United S ta te s , 
descending from sovereignty of Ehglish k ings , i s vested in 
the Pres ident for federal offences and in the Governors of the 
s t a t e s for offences against s t a t e code. 
In times the prerogat ive of mercy or pardon i s an i nd i s -
pensable component of a well balanced system of criminal 
1. Christen Jenses , 'Pardon' Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences (New York, Macmillen 1933) Vol. I I p . 571. 
jurisprudence and mitigation of sever i ty i s considered 
humantarian. Accordingly, the executive has been invested 
with the power to grant pardon when prescribed pena l i t i e s 
were severe in individual cases . 
The pardoning power usually contains the l e s se r power 
of coaimutation of sentence. A death penalty may be commuted 
to l i f e imprisonment or a sentence of imprisonment reduced 
in length by commutation. Commutation is not a condit ional 
pr an unconditional pardon but a change from a higher to a 
lower penalty in the scale of punishment i t is a form of 
clemency, as i s the pardon, but to a lesser degree. 
These provisions are contained in our cons t i tu t ion under 
Ar t i c l e 72 which i s the topic of t h i s d i s se r ta t ion a l s o . 
Wherein the President is empowered to grant pardon, reprieve, 
r e s p i t e remission or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence 
of any person convicted of any offence. 
The degree of severity depends on what hardship a people 
are accustomed t o . For example, in a society what has accustomed 
to anes the t ics , the people are more sensi t ive to physical pain. 
Undoubtedly, in the pat terns of l i v ing , as well as those of 
punishment, have created the sof tness , ra ther than the softness 
c rea t ing the change in the p a t t e r n s . To i l l u s t r a t e by analogy, 
we are not so much concerned with the fact that modem individuals 
may not be able to withstand an operation without anesthet ic 
30 readily as t h e i r great-great grandfathers could as \)e are 
with the fac t that the prac t ice of surgery has changed and 
involves l e s s hardship to the pa t i en t . 
P re -cona t i tu t iona l posi t ion of the pardoning power was 
the same as* in England, since the sovereign of England was 
the sovereign of India. Conferment of executive clemency is 
found through a l l the criminal procedure codes. Appellate 
courts were given power to suspend sentences pending appeal. 
Codes of 1861 and 1872 gave power of remission at the hands of 
the execut ive . Codes of 1882 and(j98^ conferred addit ional 
powers on the executive to suspend sentences a t any time. 
But these l a t t e r codes fur ther provided that the power has to 
be exercised by the appel la te courts "for the reasons to be 
recorded in wri t ing". I t i s pert inent to note that t h i s 
s t r ingent procedural formality was not made applicable to the 
executive power. This evidently indicates a clue regarding 
di f ferent nature of clemency or suspension powers exercisable 
both by executive and jud ic i a ry , toder the Government of India 
Act 1935 the pardoning power was contained in Section 295. So 
the exercise of the k ing ' s power remained not only ui^ffected, 
unfettered and unparallel but also enjoyed absolute pr iv i lege 
throughout a l l times. The same power of pardon has been 
conferred on the President of India and on the Governors of 
the State by Art ic les 72 and 161 respec t ive ly . I t i s the 
cons t i t u t iona l scheme the administration of j u s t i c e i s in the 
hands of j ud ic i a ry ; so the judic iary has to pronounce the 
judgment and the sentence and i t i s for executive to enforce 
i t . The logic behind providing mercy as prerogative of 
pardoning i s to prevent i n ju s t i ce and serve public v^elfare. 
That i s why mercy power has been granted to the President under 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n . The President being the Supreme Head of the 
Sta te possesses this supreme power. 
I t may be stated tha t jud ic i a l power i s governed by 
j u d i c i a l considerations and the executive power i s governed by 
consideration of public pol icy . Though these two powers may 
have f i e ld s imilar to be effected but these operate in d i s t i n c t 
and on d i f fe ren t p r i nc ip l e s . 
The question regarding pardoning power before the 
2 Supreme Court was raised in Nanavatl case where Supreme Court 
by a majority temporarily departed from the se t t l ed law of 
pardon. But s c i n t i l l a t i n g judgment of J . Kapur in d issent ing 
opinion served as a s t r i ng in t h i s law and deserves the festoon 
of cont inui ty in keeping to d i s t i n c t both these executive and 
3 jud ic ia l control over the sentence. In Kul.jeet Singh case 
2. Inf r a / n . 28 at p . 47 
3o Lifra n . 54- at p . 54 
another important question was raised tha t power conferred by 
Ar t i c le 72 on the President to grant pardon and commute senten-
ces was a power coupled with a duty which must be f a i r l y and 
reasonably exercised. But the court observed that P res iden t ' s 
power may have to await examination on an appropriate occasion, 
and tha t appropriate occasion was got by court in Kehar Singh 
case where some important points were decided. 
Whether death penalty i s cons t i t u t i ona l or not i s not 
the' subject of th is d i s se r t a t ion even then i t s relevance ra ther 
importance can be discussed here succin t ly , because the issue 
has been ra ised in some cases while discussing the nature and 
scope of Ar t ic le 72 of the cons t i tu t ion . As in Bachan Singh 
5 
case i t was submitted with some vehemence and persistence by 
Shri fi.K. Grarg that Jagmohan' s case needs reconsideration as 
4 . Infra n . 4-6 at p . 63 
5. Bachan Singh v. State of Pun .jab, A.I.R. 1980 SG 893 and 
A . I .E . 1982 SO 1325. 
6. Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.. A.I.R. 1973 SC 947-
In th i s case the cons t i tu t iona l va l i d i t y of death 
sentence was for the f i r s t time convassed before Supreme 
Court where i t was held tha t death penalty is not uncons-
t i t u t i o n a l on the ground that no procedure i s laid down 
by the law for determining whether the sentence of death 
or something less i s appropriate in the case . Capital 
sentence i s not per se unreasonable or not in the public 
i n t e r e s t . 
the death penalty i s uncons t i tu t iona l . But the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed i t s e a r l i e r decision and held tha t the provision of 
death penalty as an a l te rna t ive punishment for murder in 
Section 302 I .P .O. i s not unreasonable and i t i s in the public 
i n t e r e s t . 
However, Justice*P.N. Bhagwati did not agree with the 
madority view and gave a d issent ing judgment holding that 
Section 302 I .P .O. in so fa r as i t provides for the invocation 
of death penalty as an a l t e r n a t i v e to l i f e sentence is u l t r a 
v i r e s and void as being v io l a t i ve of Art ic le H and 21 of the 
cons t i tu t ion since i t does not provide any l e g i s l a t i v e guide-
l i n e s as to when l i f e should be permitted to be extinguished 
by the imposition of death sentence. 
While expressing his view he observed that no possible 
j ud i c i a l safeguards can prevent conviction of the innocent . . . 
This i s the d r a s t i c nature of death penalty, t e r r i fy ing in i t s 
consequences which has to be taken into account in determining 
i t s cons t i tu t iona l v a l i d i t y . Death penalty i s barbaric and 
inhuman in i t s e f fec t , mental and physical upon the condemned 
man and i s pos i t ive ly c rue l . I t s psychological effect on the 
prisoner in the Death Row i s d i s a s t rous . 
The same issue as to reconsider the cons t i tu t iona l 
va l i d i t y of the s ta tutory provisions in the Indian Penal Code 
providing for the death sentence v;as raised by Shri Shanti 
7 Bhuahan in Kehar Singh case while emphasising upon the 
d issent ing judgment in Bachan Singh case. But Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the va l id i ty of death sentence as decided in 
Bachan Singh case and refused to reopen the i s sue . As the 
law stands, l i f e imprisonment i s rule and death penalty i s 
given in the " ra res t of r a re" cases . 
Recentl>^''"^Supreme Court bench comprising Mr. Jus t ices 
G.L. Oza, Mr. K.N. Singh, Mr. M.M. Dutta, Mr. K.J. Shetty and 
Mr. L.M. Sbarma held that delayed disposal of a condensned 
p r i s o n e r ' s pe t i t i on e i ther by the President or the Governor 
e n t i t l e s him to move the Supreme Court for commutation of 
death sentence. 
While upholding the v a l i d i t y of death sentence the 
Supreme Court held that 'de lay ' s t a r t s from the date of 
f i n a l i t y of verd ic t by the apex court but the time spent by 
the condemned pr isoner in f i l i n g review pe t i t ion and repeated 
mercy pe t i t i ons before the executive shal l not be considered 
for commuting b i s death sentence to l i f e imprisonment. 
The much awaited verdic t has set at r e s t the long drawn 
controversy raked up by conf l ic t ing views expressed by d i f ferent 
benches each comprising two judges and three judges on the 
7. Kehar Singh v . Union of India. A.I.R. 19^9 SO 653. 
SiVTimes of India , February 9, 1989. 
8 
condemned p r i s o n e r ' s r i g h t to seek commutation i f the re was 
de l ay in execut ion of s e n t e n c e . While the two judges bench 
g 
in Vatheeswaran case held t h a t two-year delay in the execut ion 
of sentence was s u f f i c i e n t f o r commutation, a t h r e e judges 
10 in Sber Singh case held tha t delay alone i s n o t good enough 
f o r commutation and two-year de lay could no t be l a i d dovm as 
r u l e . 
While s p e c i f i c a l l y the period dur ing which the P res iden t 
must dec ide a mercy p e t i t i o n , the judges however said " i t must 
be observed t h a t when such p e t i t i o n s under A r t i c l e 72 or 161 
of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a r e received by the a u t h o r i t i e s concerned 
i t i s expected t h a t t hese p e t i t i o n s s h a l l be disposed of 
e x p e d i t i o u s l y " . Mr. J . Shetty sa id in h i s judgment t h a t the 
c o u r t can not p r e s c r i b e a time l i m i t f o r d i sposa l of even 
'mercy p e t i t i o n s ' because the time taken by the execu t ive or 
P r e s i d e n t may depend upon the n a t u r e of the case and the scope 
of i nqu i ry to be made. 
11 12 
In Maru Ram and Kehar Singh cases the Supreme Court 
has given a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l impetus to the P r e s i d e n t ' s power of 
p a r d o n i n g . Nei ther the delay of two yea r s nor th ree y e a r s or 
de lay a s a whole has been held as a po ten t f a c t o r f o r conver t ing 
9 . T.V. Vatheeswaran v . S t a t e of Tamil Nadu. AIR 1983 SO 361 . 
10. Sher Singh v . S t a t e of Pun .lab, AIR 1983 SG 465. 
11 . A . I . R . 1980 3C 2147. 
12 . I n f r a n . 46 a t p . 6 3 . 
the death sentence into a l i f e imprisonment or s e t t i n g the 
convict a t l i b e r t y . Assuming tha t the death sentence i s an 
"exception" given in the " rares t of r a re cases" i s regarded 
a cons t i t u t i ona l necess i ty in our soc ie ty . Therefore, the 
scope of Art ic le 72 has assuned a grea ter cons t i tu t iona l 
importance in view of r e ta in ing the c a p i t a l punishment as 
prescr ibed by the law a perfect ly val id procedure. 
The court has fur ther refused to prescr ibe the time 
l imi t within which the mercy pe t i t ion under Ar t i c le 72 sha l l 
be disposed of by the Pres iden t . This has r i g h t l y been done 
by the cou r t . Because in some cases i t may not be possible 
for the President of India to do ju s t i ce while disposing of 
mercy p e t i t i o n . As the court has r igh t ly observed that the 
higher au thor i ty may be there to detect the e r ro r if any 
committed by the apex court while f ina l ly determining the 
sentence. 
The very purpose of Art ic le 72 i s to enable the President 
of India to dispose of the nercy pe t i t i on on merits and not by 
way of mechanical and bureaucrat ical manner. Because the very 
purpose of confirmation of the death sentence by the High 
Court a i id the Supreme Court as the apex court of ttie land and 
u l t imate ly by the President of India i s that no innocent person 
should be hanged because of b i s_no j2£ im^ Keeping the f a l l i -
b i l i t y of human beings , the Supreme Court has conceded the 
10 
r i g h t of President to review the mercy pet i t ion of the convict 
on meri ts without giving any considerat ion to the judgment of 
Supreme Court. Further supreme court has asserted i t s e l f to 
j u d i c i a l l y review the mercy pe t i t ion disposed of by the 
Pres ident under Ar t i c le 72 not on meri ts but on i r r e l evan t , 
i r r a t i o n a l and extraneous cons idera t ions . 
Keeping t h i s cons t i tu t iona l significance and importance 
of the power of the President under Ar t ic le 72 of our cons t i tu-
t ion I have de l ibe ra t e ly chosen i t as the topic of my d i s se r t a -
t i o n . 
The d i s se r t a t ion consists of three chapters . The h i s to -
r i c a l aspect of the power of pardon of President of India as 
contained in Ar t i c l e 72 of the cons t i tu t ion has been very 
e labora te ly dealt in chapter I . While t racing out h i s t o r i ca l 
background of the power to pardon an attempt has been made to 
see the Brit ish p rac t i ce as i t was avai lable in England and 
during the Br i t i sh Raj in India and a l so the debates of the 
Consti tuent Assembly. 
Chapter I I deals with the conceptual meaning of various 
terms used in Ar t i c le 72 of the Constitution of India . 
The Scope and ambit of the j u d i c i a l review of Supreme 
Court with regard to Art ic le 72 i s the thrash of the Chapter I I I . 
11 
In tbe ul t imate analysis a humble effort has been made 
to conclude the discussion r e l a t i ng to Art icle 72 or the 
P r e s i d e n t i a l power of pardoning in the concluding par t of the 
d i s s e r t a t i o n . 
C H A P T E R - I 
HISTOHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A) ENGLAND 
Generally speaking the pardoning power of the executive 
in India ia the same as the power of the king or queen of 
England and the President of U.S.A. and more spec i f ica l ly as 
before our cons t i tu t ion came into force the law of pardon in 
India was the same as in England. The framers of the Indian 
Consti tution followed the time-honored t r ad i t i on of conferring 
the pardoning power on the executive head of 1he s t a t e . So in 
order to have a h i s t o r i c a l study of t h i s power i t i s necessary 
to s t a r t i t from the origin of the Grown pardoning power. 
The origin of the Crown's pardoning power is connected 
with the Crown's prerogat ive . So to discuss the Cixiwn's pardon-
ing powers, history of prerogative i s indispensable. What 
preregat ive i s can only be understand by the defini t ion and 
the decision of the leading cases . 
By the word ' p re roga t ive ' we usually understand 
that spec ia l pre-eminence, which the king hath, over and 
above a l l other persons, and out of the ordinary course 
of the common law, in r igh t of his regal d ign i ty . I t s i g -
n i f i e s , in i t s etymology (from pare and rogo) , something 
that i s required . o r demanded before, or in preference t o , a l l 
o thers . And hence i t follows, that i t must be in i t s nature 
13 
s ingular 
/and eccen t r i ca l ; tha t i t can only be applied to those r igh t s 
and c apac i t i e s which Ihe king enjoys alone, in contradict ion 
to others and not to those which he enjoys in common with any 
of his subjects '* tor if once any one prerogative of the Crown 
could be held in common with the subject , i t would cease to be 
prerogat ive any longer. And therefore . Finch lays i t down as 
a maxim, that the prerogative i s tha t law in case of the king, 
which i s law in no case of the subject. 
According to Wade - The medieval king both feudal lord 
and head of s t a t e , as chief feudal lord and in theory the owner 
of a l l land the king had a l l the r igh t s of a feudal loird and in 
addit ion cer ta in exceptional r igh t s over and above those of a l l 
other l o r d s . Like other lords the king could not be sued in 
h is own cour t s , as there was no lord superior to the king, 
there was no court in which the king could be sued. In addition 
the king as head of 1jae s t a t e had powers accounted for by the 
need for the preservation of the s tate agains t external foes and 
in "undefined residue of power which he might use for the public 
good". 
As we have observed tha t medieval lawyers did not regard 
the king as above the law. Moreover, certain of the royal 
functions could only be exercised in certain ways. The common 
1. Blackstone's Commentaries, 239. 
2 . 4-4, Sir David Keir and F.Ef, Law son, Cases in Consti tut ional 
Law, ed. 4* 
u 
law courts were the king 's court and only through them could 
the king decide questions of t i t l e to land and punish fe lon ies . 
Yet as the fountain of jus t i ce the king possessed a residuary 
power of doing j u s t i c e through h is council where the courts of 
common law were inadequate. 
The common lawyers asserted that there was a fundamental 
d i s t inp t ion between what come to be called the ordinary as 
opposed to absolute prerogat ive . The ordinary prerogativ^menT*-^ 
those royal functions could only be exercised, in defined ways 
and involved no element of royal d i s c re t ion . Thus, the king 
could not himself ac t as a judge; he could dispense jus t i ce 
through his judges. The king too could exercise l e g i s l a t i v e 
au thor i ty through Parliament J The case of proclamations. The 
absolute or extra-ordinary prerogative meant those powers which 
the king could exercise in his d i sc re t ion . I t w ^ round the 
absolute prerogat ive tha t the 17th century s t ruggle between 
king and parliament centred. The king has undoubted powers to 
exercise d iscre t ion in the i n t e r e s t of the s t a t e , especial ly 
In times of emergency, but t b e c l a i m s j ^ S t ua r tK ings in t h i s 
regard could not be reconciled with the growing claims of 
Parliament. The absolute prerogative covered a wider f ie ld 
than the k ing ' s r i gh t to take extra-ordinary action to meet 
emergencies. I t was primarily around the k ing ' s emergency 
powers that the 17th century struggle turned, but the r i gh t s 
15 
to pardon a criminal or grant a peerage were also part of the 
absolute as opposfi^to the ordinary prerogat ive . They could be 
exercised a t the king 's d i s c r e t i o n . Here are some of the leading 
cases with regard to the k ing ' s prerogative and most of which 
are decided in favour of the Crown. 
In Ba te ' s case . an information was exhibited in the 
Exchequer agains t John Bate, a merchant t rad ing to Venice and 
the Levant, for his refusal to pay a poundage of 2S. 6d. The 
argument of the Counsel have not been preserved, but i t appeared 
tha t Bate, having paid the s ta tu tory poundage, refused to pay 
the new duty because i t was imposed unjustly against the s t a t u t e 
45 Ed. 3 , C.4, which prohibited indirect taxat ion without the 
consent of Parliament. The decision of the Barons of Exchequer 
was unanimous for the k ing . The g i s t of the decision was that 
the king might impose what duties he pleased if i t ves only for 
the purpose of regula t ing trade and not of ra is ing revenue, and 
the court could not go behind the k ing ' s statement tha t the duty 
was in fact imposed for the regulat ion of t r ade . 
4 
In the case of Ship Money John Hampden, knight of the 
RYli T^Bnf_gijjf^jnff»^^ , refused to pay ship money, a tax 
levied for the purpose of fuirnishing ships in time of nat ional 
danger. Counsel for Hampden conceded tha t sometimes the exercise 
3 . (1606), 2 State Tr ia l s 371. 
4 . King V. Hampden (1637) 3ST. TR 825. 
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of danger wil l j u s t i f y taking the subjec t ' s goods without his 
consent , but only in actual as opposed to threatened emergency. 
The Crown conceded tha t the subject could not be taxed in 
normal circumstances without the consent of Parliament, but 
contended that the king was the sole judge whether an emergency 
j u s t i f i e d the exercise of his prerogat ive power to r a i s e fund 
to meet the na t iona l dangero A majority of the court of 
Exchequer Chamber gave judgment for the king. 
5 
In the case of God den v. Halea, the defendant, as a 
Colonel of a regiment of foot, was obliged by the Test i c t 
/25 Car 2) to receive the sacrament as the Act directed and to 
take the oaths of al legiance and supremacy within three months 
of being admitted to his charge. This he neglected to do, and 
was tr ied and convicted at the Kentassizes, whereupon the 
p l a i n t i f f as informer become en t i t l ed to a sum of £500 to be 
fo r f i e t ed by the defendant for h is breach of the Act; to recover 
which sum the present action of debt was brought. The defendant 
pleaded that within three months of h is appointment and before 
the s u i t began, the (James-l i ) had by his l e t t e r s patent under 
the Great Seal dispensed him from taking the oaths and other 
ob l iga t ions imposed by the Test Act. The question was whether 
the dispensation was a good bar to the ac t ion . 
The decision of LoixS Chief Jus t i ce Herbert and of ten 
of the other eleven judges, (Street d i s s e n t i e n t e ) , was: 
5 . (1686) 11 State Tr ia l 1165. 
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1. That the king of England are sovereign pr inces . 
2 . That the laws of England are the k ing ' s laws. 
3 . That therefore, i t i s an inseparable prerogative in the 
kings of England, to dispense with penal laws in p a r t i c u l a r 
cases , and upon p a r t i c u l a r necessary reasons . 
4-« That of those reasons and those n e c e s s i t i e s , the king 
himself i s sole judge, and then, which i s consequent upon a l l . 
5 . That t h i s i s not a t r u s t invested i n , or granted to the 
king by the people, but the ancient remains of the sovereign 
power and prerogative of the kings of England; which never 
yet was taken from them, nor can be . And therefore , such a 
dispensation appearing upon record to come time enough to 
save him from the f o r f e i t u r e , judgment ought to be given for 
the defendant. 
The decision can be upheld on l e s s extravagant grounds, 
as was done by Herbert himself in the vindicat ion of his 
judgment which he published l a t e r . He follows Y.B.II , Hen VII 
f o l 11-12, in d is t inguishing between tha t which i s malum in se 
and t h a t which i s merely malum prohibitum by s t a t u t e . With 
the former the king can never dispense, though be may afterwards 
pardon. 'For a dispensation does jus dare, and makes the thing 
prohibi ted (to a l l otiiers) lawful to be done by him that has i t . 
And therefore , the king can not dispense with mala in se, 
because they never were, and never can be , made lawful; but 
even these (says the year book) may be pardoned af te r they are 
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done. The r e s u l t ia that 'whatever is not prohibited "by the 
law of Grod, but was lawful before any act of Parliament made 
to f o r b i t i t , the king, by his dispensat ion, granted to a 
p a r t i c u l a r person, may make lawful again, to what person who 
has such dispensat ion, though i t continues unlawful to every-
body e l s e . Therefore, dispensation granted to Sir Edward 
Hales did make i t lawful for him to do so, though i t continued 
unlawful for anybody e l s e . However, even today the sovereign 
i s regarded as the pivot on which the s t a t e machinery revolves 
and enjoys the sole executive place in the parliament by customs 
and laws. The Act of Settlement affirmed the laws of England 
to be the bi r th r igh t of the people and "a l l the kings and 
queens who shal l ascend the throne of t h i s realm ought to 
adminis ter the government according to the said laws, and 
t h e i r of f icers and minis ters ought to serve them respect ive ly 
according to the same". 
I t i s , however, preferable to confine i t to common law 
powers. I t i s a lso sometimes in the sense, that i s now perhaps 
a rcha ic , of certain of those a t t r i b u t e s of the sovereign which 
r e s u l t from the headship of the s t a t e . Thus, the term, preroga-
t i v e of per fec t ion , i s used of the rule tha t the Crown can do no 
wrong J Prerogative of perpetu i ty of the ru le tha t succession of 
the sovereign i s simultaneous with the death of his predecessor. 
The leaving ot the prerogative today i s , however, that group of 
powers of the Crown not conferred by the s t a t u t e but recognised 
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6 by the coauaon law as belonging to the Crown. 
As we have seen tha t bow the Crown has exercised his 
prerogative in general s imi lar ly the criminal proceedings may 
a l so be prevented by the exercise of royal prerogative of pardon, 
This power of pardoning i s exercised by the Crown on the advice 
of Home Secretary of State t ha t due to some specia l reason the 
sentence should not be carr ied out . 
The king can pardon a cr iminal , e i t h e r absolutely or 
upon condit ion, and th i s power wielded by the Home Secretary, 
i s sometimes used as a means (a clumsier means there could not 
7 
be) for p r a c t i c a l l y nul l i fy ing an unsat isfactory ve rd ic t . 
Before 1908 English law provided no adequate means of reviewing 
j u d i c i a l l y the judgment of a criminal cour t , accordingly the 
method of r ec t i fy ing any in jus t i ce was by the grant of a pardon. 
The Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, established the Court of Criminal 
Appeal - a s imi la r court was established for Scotland in 1928. 
The prerogative of pardon i s e s sen t i a l ly an executive act and 
should not involve jud ic ia l i s s u e s . But the prerogative s t i l l 
remains and i s in pa r t i cu la r exercised by the Home Secretary in 
r e l a t i on to death sentences, a l l of which by long standing 
customs are reviewed. By Section 19 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 
1907, the Secretary of the S t a t e , on the consideration of any 
6 . E.C.S. Wade, Const i tut ional Law of England, p . H 1 
7 . P.W. Maitland - "Consti tut ional History of England" p.476. 
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pe t i t ion for the exercise of the prerogat ive , may (a) re fe r the 
whole caae to the court of Criminal Appeal, and the case sha l l 
then be heard and determined by the cour t , as in the case of an 
appeal by the person convicted, or (b) if he desires the 
ass i s tance of the court on any point a r i s i ng in the case re fe r 
that point for the i r opinion thereupon. 
^ The royal power of pardon does not extend to c i v i l 
proceedings. If A owes B a debt, the Crown has no power to 
writ" off the debt. So if A assaul t s or l i b e l s B, the Crown 
can not forgive A, or stop B from suing A. This is so , even 
when the wrong i s a crime as well as a t o r t . Thus, in the 
case of f a l s e imprisonment, which i s both a wrong in tort 
and a crime the queen can pardon the crime, but not the t o r t . 
The Importance of th i s can be seen if we suppose the person 
gu i l t y of f a l s e imprisonment to be a Secretary of s t a t e , for 
the Crown can not prevent h i s being sued. Heavy damages have 
before now been recovered against a Secretary of s t a t e . The 
Crown could not protect of i t s most eminent servants . 
The one l imit to the efficacy of a pardon i s tha t 
imposed by -toe Act of Settlement (1700) namely, that a pardon 
can not be pleaded to an impeachment. In Danby's case 1678, 
i t had been questioned whether an impeachment could be prevented 
by a pardon, i t had been contended tha t an impeachment should be 
considered as analogous r a t h e r to an appeal of felony than to 
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an ind ic tmen t a t the k i n g ' s s u i t . A pardon then can not s top 
an impeachment, but t h e r e i s no th ing t o p reven t king from 
pardoning a f t e r the impeached person has been convicted and 
sen tenced . 
The l e g a l power of pardon then i s very ex tens ive indeed . 
The check upon i t i s no t l e g a l but c o n s i s t s of t h i s , t h a t k i n g ' s 
S e c r e t a r y may have to answer in the House of Commons fo r the 
e x e r c i s e of t h a t power. 
B) THE LAW OF PAHDON BEFORE CONSTITUTION 
The law of pardon before the c o n s t i t u t i o n came i n t o force 
was the same as in England s ince the sovere ign of England was 
the sovere ign of I n d i a . However, i t w i l l be f r u i t f u l to trace 
out the l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y of the r e l e v a n t powers of the 
e x e c u t i v e and the j u d i c i a r y . In regard to suspension of s en -
t e n c e s success ive Criminal Procedure Codes conferred on the 
e x e c u t i v e in India l i m i t e d powers of clemency and a l so conferred 
upon the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t . Pov/er to suspend a sentence pending 
a p p e a l s . I t i s b e t t e r t o mention some of the p r o v i s i o n s of 
the d i f f e r e n t codes to understand the c l e a r pos i t ion of the 
e x e c u t i v e and j u d i c i a r y . 
In the Criminal Procedure Code of 1861 (XXV of 1861) 
the power of the execu t ive was confined to remission of pun i sh -
ments and was contained in the Section 54 which was a s under : 
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"When any person has been sentenced to punishment f o r 
an o f f e n c e , the Governor-General of I nd i a in Couac i l , o r the 
l o c a l Government, may a t any t ime , wi thout cond i t i ons or upon 
any cond i t i on which such person s h a l l a c c e p t , remit the whole 
o r any p a r t of the punishment to which he s h a l l have been 
s e n t e n c e d " . 
o 
Sect ion 421 of the same code conferred power on the 
a p p e l l a t e cour t to suspend sentences pending appeals and 
r e l e a s e . Af te r t h i s the Cr imincal Procedure Code of 1872 
was enac ted . Sect ion 322 of which was d e a l i n g with the 
execut ion of sen tences the power of the execu t ive to remit 
punishment was contained in t h a t Sec t ion . 
Then again the Criminal Procedure Code was re -enac ted 
in 1882 be ing the Act X of the 1882. The power t o suspend 
o r remit s en t ences was contained in a s epa ra t e c h a p t e r headed 
"suspens ion , remiss ion and commutations of s e n t e n c e s " of which 
t h e r e l evan t p rov i s ion was in Sect ion 401 , 
A new Criminal Procedure Code was enacted in 1898, a 
p o r t i o n of which was subsequent ly amended. The s ec t i on d e a l i n g 
with powers of suspension o r remission of sen tence i s 401 
8 . Sect ion 421 of Cr .P.C. 1861, "In any case in which an appeal 
i s a l lowed, the Appel la te cour t may, pending the appeal , 
o rder t h a t sen tence be suspended, and i f the appe l l an t be in 
confinement f o r an offence which i s b a i l a b l e , may order t h a t 
be be r e l e a s e d on b a i l " . 
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which reads as under; 
"(1) when any person has been sentenced to punishment 
fo r an offence, the Governor-General in Council or the local 
Government may at any time without conditions or upon any 
conditions which the person sentenced accepts , suspend the 
earecution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of 
the punishment to which he has been sentenced". 
The corresponding powers of the appel la te courts i s 
contained in Section 426, Chapter XXXI dealing with appeals 
e t c . Section 426 is as under:-
( l ) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate 
Court may, for reasons to be recorded by i t in wr i t ing , order 
tha t the execution of the sentence or order appealed against 
be suspended and, also if he i s in confinement, tha t he be 
released on b a i l or on his own bond. 
(2B) Where a High court i s sa t i s f ied that a convicted person 
has been granted special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court 
against any sentence which the High Court has imposed or main-
ta ined , the High Court may, if i t so thinks f i t , order that 
pending the appeal the sentence or order appealed against be 
suspended, and a l s o , if such person is confinement, that he be 
released on b a i l " . 
While going through a l l the above mentioned provisions 
of the d i f fe ren t codes of criminal procedure, i t becomes c lear 
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tha t the Codes of Criminal Procedure of 1861 and 1872, confined 
the power of the executive to remit t ing at any time, the punish-
ment in f l ic ted on a person; the Codes of 1882 and 1898 conferred 
on the executive the addi t ional power of suspending the sentence 
a t any time. The Criminal Procedure Codes of 1861, 1872, 1882 
and 1898 conferred on the appel late court power to suspend a 
sentence pending appeal, but the codes of 1882 and 1898, provided 
tha t the power was to be exercised for "reasons to be recorded 
in w r i t i n g " . Moreover, the powers conferred on the executive 
and on the appel late court were to be found in separate chapters 
of the codes, emphasizing the different na tures of the two 
powers, and a difference which was fur ther emphasized by the 
requirement that the appel la te court should record i t s reasons 
in wri t ing whereas no such obligation was imposed upon the 
execut ive . Of course, t h i s does not mean that the courts did 
not exerc ise the i r power jud ic i a l ly previous to the Act of 1882. 
The words contained in Section 426 "for reasons to be recorded 
in wr i t ing" are showing that l e g i s l a t i v e wanted to make i t 
c l ea r about the e s sen t i a l difference in the nature of the exer-
c i se of the power conferred on the executive and on the 
j u d i c i a r y . 
After coming into force of the Government of India Act, 
1935, the law of pardon was contained in Section 295 of tha t 
Act. Provisions as to death sentences (1) "where any person 
has been sentenced to death in a province, the Goveimor-General 
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in hia d i scre t ion sha l l have a l l such powers of suspension, 
remission or commutation of sentence as were vested in the 
Govern or-General in Council immediately before the commencement 
of Part I I I of th i s Act, but same as aforesaid no authori ty in 
India , outside a province sha l l have any power to suspend, 
remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted in the 
province; provided that nothing in t h i s Sub-section affects 
any power of any of f ice r of Her Majesty's forces to suspend, 
remit or commute a sentence passed by a court mart ia l (2) . 
Nothing in th is Act sha l l derogate from the r igh t of His 
Majesty or of the Governor-General, if any such r i g h t i s 
delegated to him by his Majesty, to grant pardons, repr ieves , 
r e s p i t e s or remissions of punishment". 
This was spec ia l provision as to the power of the executive 
to suspend, remitor commute a sentence of death . So the power 
of the king or of Governor-General as a delegate to grant 
suspension, remission or commutations remained unaffected by 
the introduction of a federal system with the d iv is ion of the 
subjec ts between the centre and the provinces. This Section was 
in the part dealing with, the provisions as to cer ta in legal 
m a t t e r s . Thus, under the Government of India Act the Governor-
General in his d iscre t ion had the power to remit, sentence of 
death and Governors of Provinces had the power in regard to a l l 
sentences passed in a province but the power of the Governor-
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General as a delegate remained unaffected by the f i r s t Sub-
sect ion of the Section. Thus, upto coming into force of the 
Const i tut ion the exercise of the k ing ' s prerogative remained 
g 
unaffected, was plenary, unfettered and exercisable as h i t h e r t o , 
C) CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES 
I t i s convenient to note that the pardoning power of the 
Pres ident under Ar t ic le 72 of the Consti tution were contained 
in the draf t a r t i c l e 59 of our cons t i tu t ion , when was debated 
in the Constituent Assembly. Under Ar t ic le 72, the President 
i s empowered to grant pardons, repr ieves , r e sp i t e s or remissions 
of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of 
any person convicted of an offence. The President can exercise 
t h i s power in a l l cases where the punishment or sentence i s by 
a court mar t ia l or for an offence against a law to which the 
union executive powers extends and in a l l cases of death 
sentence . This power sha l l not affect the power of an off icer 
of the armed forces or of the Gpvemor, in the case of death 
sentence, to suspend, remit or commute a sentence. 
Ar t i c l e 72 has solved the problem a r i s i n g out of divided 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . Though i t was proposed by Mr. Tajammul Hossain, 
a member of the Constituent Assembly that clause (3) of the 
Ar t ic le 59 be deleted. The reasons given by the member were 
9. Per Kapur J . (1961) 1 S . C S . p . S41 
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that : 
"The President only should have the power to suspend, 
remit or commute a sentence of death. He is the supreme head 
of the state. It follows, therefore, that he should have the 
supreme power also, I am of the opinion that the rulers of 
the state or provincial government should not be vested with 
10 this supreme power ...." 
While giving reason for his proposal he further said 
that : 
"The President of the Federation should be the supreme 
authority in respect of offences committed against Federal 
subjects, I say that there must not be divided loyalty on 
this subject. When the states came into the Federation they 
accepted the operation of the Federal Laws in their states and 
they accepted to that extent that the Federal Government was 
supreme and the President of the Federation as representing 
the Federal Government can alone be the authority who can 
grant pardons ,.," 
But this proposal was rejected by the Constituent 
Assembly, Mr. R.K. Sidhwa, another member of the Constituent 
Assembly said that it is not denied that the President should 
10. C.A.D. Vol. 7, p. 1118, 390. 
11, Ibid. 
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be tbe supreme author i ty smd expressed his views a f te r re fer r ing 
clause (1) of a r t i c l e 59. 
"Similarly powers are vested in tbe Governors and they 
can also suspend, remit or commute a sentence of death. In my 
opinion i t i s very healthy they should continue to vest t h i s 
power which existed under the old regime in the Governors of 
the Provinces for t h i s reason that the Governor of a s t a t e i s 
"better informed of a p a r t i c u l a r case of pardon which i s referred 
to him . . . . " ' ' ^ 
But Dr. B.E. Ambedkar explained t h i s in a more b e t t e r 
and convincing manner in the following words: 
" I t might be desi rable that I explain in a few words 
in i t s general out l ine the scheme embodied in Art ic le 59. I t 
i s thus i the power of the commutation of sentences for offences 
enacted by the Federal Law i s vested in the President of the 
union. The power to commute sentences fo r offences enacted by 
the Sta te Legislature i s vested in the Governors of the S ta t e . 
In the case of sentence of death, whether i t i s i n f l i c t ed under 
any law passed by Parliament or by the law of s t a t e s the power 
i s vested in both the President as well as the s t a t e concemed 
13 t h i s i s tbe scheme . . . , " . 
12. C.A.D. Vol. 7 p . 1119. 
13. C.A.D. Vol. 7 p . 1120. 
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Logically speaking that the power to commute a sentence 
of death i s vested both in the Governor as well aa in the 
Pres ident , he sa id : 
"After a l l , the offence i s committed in the p a r t i c u l a r 
l o c a l i t y . The Home Minister who would be advising the Governor 
on a mercy pet i t ion from an offender sentenced to death would 
be in a b e t t e r position to advise the Goveimor having regard to 
hia in t imate knowledge of the circumstances of the case and the 
s i tua t ion prevai l ing in that area. I t was, therefore, f e l t 
des i rab le that no harm wi l l be done if the power which the 
Governor now enjoys i s l e f t with him. There i s , however, a 
safeguard provided supposing in the case of a sentence of 
death the mercy pe t i t ion i s re jec ted, i t i s always open, under 
the provisions of t h i s a r t i c l e , for the offender to approach 
the President with another mercy pe t i t i on and try his luck 
t h e r e . I do not think there is any great v io la t ion of any 
fundamental p r inc ip le involved or any inconvenience that i s 
l i k e l y to a r i se if the provisions in the draft a r t i c l e are 
14 
re ta ined as they a r e " . 
Igain there was a nebulous and uncertain posi t ion about 
the pardoning power of the President contained in the or iginal 
sub clause (b) of clause (1 ) of a r t i c l e 59, regarding the 
concurrent l i s t . 
14. C.A.D. Vol, 7 p . 1120. 
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The o r ig ina l sub-clause (b) of clause (1) of a r t i c l e 
59 i s as fol lows: 
In a l l cases where the punishment or sentence i s for an 
offence under any law r e l a t i ng to a matter with respect to 
which Parliament has, and the Legislature of the State in which 
the offence i s committed has not , power to make laws". Therefore, 
to make i t cer ta in and c lear Mr, T.T. Krisbnamachari, a member of 
the Constituent Assembly proposed a new sub clause (b) of clause 
(1) of Art ic le 59 which was adopted. The new sub clause (b) of 
clause (1) of Ar t i c l e 59 i s as follows? 
"In a l l cases where the punishment or sentence i s for an 
offence under any law re la t ing to a matter to which the executive 
power of the union extend". 
This clause was again ob;)ected by Sh. K. Santhanam 
a member in the Constituent Assembly. As the words "made by 
Parliament" are absolutely e s sen t i a l to make the precise and 
c l e a r . 
But the scope of this new subst i tuted sub-clause (b) 
of clause (1) of Ar t ic le 59 was apt ly defined by Dr. B.R. 
Ambedkar. "No, i t can not extend fur ther . The necessi ty for 
br inging an amendment in sub clause (b) i s t h i s : the executive 
power of the centre extends only to the matters enumerated in 
l i s t - I but may also extend to matters enumerated in Lis t I I I . 
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And the posi t ion ot the Drafting Committee i s t h i s , that 
whenever a law i s made by Parliament, in respect of any matter 
contained in L i s t - I I I if the law confers executive power on 
the cent re , the power of the President to grant reprieve must 
extend to t h a t law. Therefore, these words are necessary. 
Kr. Santhanam's amendment i s absolutely unnecessary and out 
15 
of place because Art icle 60 covers that po in t " . 
15. C.A.D. Vol. 10 p . 
C H A P T E R - I I 
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 72 
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 72 
The power to pardon has been exercised from the time 
immemorial by the bead of the state* Whether he be an 
absolute monarch or a popular republic or constitutional 
king or queen. This humanistic c^aerobatev approach either 
to correct the grave injustice or to control the blood-shed 
or revolution is found in almost all the constitutions. 
Generally the provisions of our constituion have been 
taken from the constitutions of England and America. That 
is why, while interpreting principle or provision may be of 
law of contract, or of criminal law or of constitutional law 
references are given of the English or American authorities. 
Again in the constituent assembly debs^e it is 
recognised that the power to pardon which is vested in the 
President and the Governors of States is similar with that 
of the power of the king or queen in England and the 
President of America. However, the position of one country 
is not identical with that of other. As in England the 
head is monarch having no written constution whereas in 
America the wordings of the article containing pardoning 
power of the President is not identical with that of 
India. 
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The pardoning power of the President i s contained in 
A r t i c l e 72 of the cons t i tu t ion . Now as to the question that 
what i s the scope of Ar t ic le 72 can be judged and determined 
through the j ud i c i a l decisions so f a r . 
Art ic le 72 provides that : 
(1) The President sha l l have the power to grant pardons, 
r e p r i e v e s , r e sp i t e or remission of punishment or to suspend, 
remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any 
offence -
(a) in a l l cases where the punishment or sentence i s 
by a Court Mart ia l ; 
(b) in a l l cases where the punishment or sentence is 
for an offence against any law re l a t ing to a matter to which 
the executive power of the union extends; 
(o) in a l l cases where the sentence i s a sentence of 
death. 
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of the clause (1) sha l l 
affect the power conferred by law on any of f icer of Armed 
Forces of the union to suspend, remit or commute a sentence 
passed by a Court Mar t ia l . 
(3) Nothing in aub c lause(c) of c l a u s e d ) sha l l affect the 
power to suspend, remit or commute a sentence of death exer-
cisable by the Governors of a s ta te under any law for the time 
being in fo r ce . 
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PARDON 
The term 'pardon' is first found in early Prencb Law 
and derives from tbe Latin word 'pardonare' ("to grant freely") 
suggesting a gift bestowed by tbe sovereign. It bas tbus 
came to be associated witb a somewbat personal concessions by 
a bead of state to tbe perpetrator of an offence, in mitigation 
or remission of tbe full punisbment wbat be bas merited. 
Tbis was a part "of tbat special pre-eminence wbich the 
king bath over and above all other persons and out of tbe 
ordinary course of the common law, in the right of his royal 
dignity".^ 
The pardon is said by Lord Coke to be a "work of mercy, 
whereby the king, either before attainder, sentence or convic-
tion or after forgiveth any crime, offence, punishment, 
execution, right, title, debt or duty, temporal or 
3 
ecclesiastical". 
Pardon, as said by Holmes J. is not a private act of 
grace from an individual happening to process power. It is 
a part of tbe constitutional scheme. When granted it is tbe 
determination of the ultimate authority that the public 
1. Sanford H. Kadish, "Encyclopeadia of Crime and Justice" 
Vol. I, p. 58. 
2. Bl. Comm. (1) 239. 
3. 3 (Inst. 233). 
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welfare be better served by inflicting leas than what the 
judgment fixed. 
5 Pardon, as described by Kayne J. in Ex Parte Wells 
as an act of mercy and an act of clemency applicable to pardons 
of every kind and form. Whereas Field J. in Ex Parte Garland 
termed it as the benign prerogative of mercy. It is the power 
for avoiding the execution of the judgment by reprieve or 
pardon whereof the former is temporary and the latter permanent, 
REPRIEVE 
Reprieve means a story of execution of a sentence or of 
enforcement of a penalty, for a temporary period. It is with-
drawing, or suspending, for a time sentence of execution against 
a prisoner (Les Termes de la Lay) . In America, a reprieve is 
granted till the birth of the baby where a female prisoner 
under sentence of death and also where a prisoner becomes 
insane after judgment under the constitution, the President 
and Governors shall also possess a power of reprieve to be 
o 
exercised in f i t cases . Reprieve whereby the execution i s 
suspended i s merely the postponement of the execution for a 
de f in i t e time and i t does not and can not defeat the ul t imate 
execution of the judgment but merely delays i t . I t i s extended 
4- Biddle v .Perovlch. 71 L.ed. 1161,1163 5. 8 L.Ed. 640 at 
6. 18 L. Ed. 366 a t 370, 371. 643,644 
7. New Law Dictionary, 2nd Ed. 
8. Blackstone, Commentaries IV, XXXI. 
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to a prisoner in order to afford him an opportunity to procure 
some amelioration of the sentence which has been imposed upon 
him.^ 
RESPITE 
Respite means awarding a l e s s e r sentence instead of the 
penalty prescribed in view of the fac t that the accused has 
bad no previous conviction or the l i k e . In England i t i s not 
ava i lab le in the case of conviction of murder. Under our 
cons t i t u t ion the executive i s also vested with th i s power. 
REMISSION 
Remission reduces the amount of a sentence without 
changing its character, e.g. a sentence for imprisonment for 
one year may be remitted to six months under Section 407 
Or. P.O. The central and states governments also possess this 
power.through President and Grovernors. 
COMMUTATION 
Commutation is a change to a lighter penalty of a 
different form as under Sections 34 and 33 of the Indian Penal 
Code deals with commutation of a sentence of death and 
transportation for life. But Section 402 of Or. P.O. is wider 
and says that each of following sentences may be commuted for 
the sentence next following it - death, imprisonment for life, 
9. Ex Parte Garland 18 L. Ed. 366 at 3705. 
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rigorous imprisonment, simple imprisonment, simple imprisonment 
fine. No limitation is imposed on the power of the executive 
in India to commute a sentence under this statutory provision 
just mentioned* 
NATURE ASP OBJECT OF PABDON 
With regard to the question as what is the nature and 
object of the pardoning power of head of the state. Before 
dealing with this question it is better to mention that power 
of the Indian President under Article 72 is similar with that 
of the power of the Crown in fkigland and the power of the 
President of America under Article 2, Section 2 clause (1) 
11 
of the American Constitution. It will not be inappropriate 
to say that the freuners of the Indian Constitution were not 
only familiar and trained in British Jurisprudence but were 
familiar with the American Constitution and they were drafting 
their constitution in English language and therefore to draw 
upon the American parallel would be wholly legitimate. 
10. K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay. AIB 1961, SC 113,114. 
11. Marshall, C.J. said "As this power had been exercised from 
time Immemorial by the executive of that nation whose 
language is ours language, and whose judicial institutions 
are ours bears a close resemblance, we adopt their princi-
ples respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and 
look into Iheir books for the rules prescribing the manner 
in which it is to be used by the person who would avail 
himself of it". U.S. v. Wilson, 8 L.Ed. 640. 
Wayne J. in Ex Parte Well, 15 L.Ed. 421 at 424 said; "We 
still think so, and that the language in the constitution, 
conferring the power to grant reprieves and pardons must 
be construed with reference to its meaning at the time of 
its adoption ..,." 
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The President or a head of a s t a t e i s granted the power 
of pardon with the view that there should be provisions in the 
law to save a person from the consequences ot a punishment 
adjudged by inadvertence or mistake against t ha t person by 
judic iary which being a human i n s t i t u t i o n i s l ike ly to e r r . 
I t i s for t ha t reason tha t the provision of pardon or mercy 
i s made in every const i tu t ion* whether monarchical i t may be 
or democratic. This posi t ion has been apt ly s tated in the 
following words: 
The object of pardoning power i s to cor rec t possible 
j ud i c i a l e r ro r s for no system of jud ic ia l administration can 
be f ree from imperfections. I t i s an a t t r i b u t e of sovereignty 
wherever the sovereignty may be to release a convict from a 
sentence which i s mistaken, harsh or disproport ionate to the 
crime. 
This i s the cons t i tu t iona l scheme tha t administration of 
j u s t i ce should be through oourta of law* Hence i t i s for the 
judic iary to pronounce judgment and sentence, i t i s for the 
executive to enforce them. Generally the enforcement of these 
judgments and sentences create no d i f f i cu l ty but circumstance 
may a r i s e where carrying out a sentence, or s e t t i ng the 
mcu3hinery of jus t i ce in motion might imperil the seifety of 
the realm. "Thus, if the enforcement of a sentence i s l i ke ly 
to lead to blood-shed and revolut ion, the executive might well 
13 pause before exposing the s t a t e to such p e r i l . 
12. Basu, The Consti tution of India 402. 
13. Seervai, Const i tut ional Law of India, 3rd ed. p . 1756. 
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14 Sen Walter P. Mondale has written in his article that 
during their debates the framers of the American Constitution 
mentioned clearly several reasons for the inclusion of the 
pardon power. James Wilson for instance noted that pardon 
particularly a person before trial might be necessary to obtain 
the testimony of accomplices. The framers also were apparently 
concerned that be a way to save a spy serving the executive in 
time of war when only the executive knew his service. 
Above all else, the pardon power is an indispensable 
element of even the perfect system of laws. The pardon is the 
instrument of mercy and the way to correct those grave injustice 
either on their facts or by an anticipated operation of the 
criminal laws that simply must be remided. 
Similar view was expressed in Ex Parte Grossman by 
15 
Taft, C.J, "Executive clemency exists to afford relief 
from undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation or 
enforcement of the criminal law. The administration of justice 
by the court is not necessarily always wise or certainly consi-
derate of circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt. To 
afford a remedy, it has always been thought essential in 
popular governments, as well as in monarchies to vest in some 
other authority than the court power to ameliorate or avoid 
14. Harnessing the President's Power (J. Bar Council India 
V. 4, 1975, p. 135. 
15. 69 L. Ed. 527 p. 530. 
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particular criminal judgment. It is a check intrusted to 
executive for special cases". 
The power of the President of America to pardon treason 
was stated as necessary and indispensable. Hamilton,thus aptly 
stated that "In seasons of insurrection or rebellion, a critical 
moments may arise where if a well time offer of pardon to the 
insurgents or rebels, the tranquility of the commonwealth may 
be destroyed. The dilatory process of convening the legisla-
ture or one of its branches for the purpose of obtaining its 
sanction, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the 
golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may 
16 
sometimes be fatal". 
Maitland expressed that king can pardon any person before 
or after the trial the only limitation is that of impeachment. 
The king can pardon a crimical, either absolutely or upon 
condition and this power, wielded by the Home Secretary, is 
sometimes used as a means (a clummsier means there could not 
17 be) for practically nullifying an unsatisfactory verdict. 
PAHDON JJd) AMNESTY PISTPfGUISHED 
The word 'pardon' derives from the Latin Pardonare 
which means (to grant freely) suggesting a gift bestowed by 
16, Federalist No. 24, quoted in argument in Ex Parte Garland 
(1867) 4 Wal. 333. 
17. Maitland P.W., "Constitutional History of England", p.476. 
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the sovereign. Amnesty on the other hand derives from the 
Greek Amnestia which means (forgetting) and has came to be used 
to describe measure of a more general nature, directed to 
18 
offences whose criminality is considered better forgetten. 
The pardon and amnesty are different because the pardon 
is applied to a specified individuals whereas amnesty is applied 
to the unspecified number. Pardon is to forgive whereas amnesty 
is a promise not to take any action against the persons addressed 
if they will accept the order. 
It sometime happens that a revolt or other political 
commotion takes place in a country. On such occasions the 
bead of the state makes a proclamation that the rebels who 
surrender shall be granted pardon for the offences they have 
committed. May it be said that the President of India does 
not have this power under Article 72? But in this connection 
the matter which need particular attention that whatever word 
may have been used in the proclamation, the President or the 
head of the state in actual fact does nothing more than the 
promise that whatever action could be taken against them. So 
the question of granting pardon of punishment to such persons 
can arise only when a competent court would have held that such 
person had actually participated in it and so having been 
convicted for the same have been sentenced to a specified 
punishment. So whatever may be the word used in the proclama-
tion in actual fact there is no grant of pardon of punishment 
18. Sanford H. Kadish, Encyclopeadia of Crime and Justice, 
Vol. I, p. 58. 
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but it is only a promise not to take any action against the 
19 20 
rebels. Pardon and amnesty is also distinguished by Basu 
in the following words? 
"The pardoning power should be distinguished from 
amnesty, while pardon remits the punishment imposed by a 
court upon an offender, amnesty overlooks the offence and 
absolves the offender from penalty". 
By this he mean that President does not have the 
power of granting amnesty to rebels. In this connection, 
attention may be drawn to the fact that the power of pardon 
to the President under Article 72 is not unlimited, but is 
only in respect of the offences which have been indicated 
in Sub-clause (a),(b) and (c) of clause (1) of that Article. 
Thus, if the rebellion is against a state government the 
offer of amnesty may be made only by the concerned state* 
Be it as it may at least this is quite evident that pardon 
and the amnesty differ in their import and so amnesty does 
21 
not fall within the ambit of Article 72. Supreme Court of 
America also expressed the same opinion. It observed : 
"Amnesty and pardon axe of different character and 
have different purposes. The one overlooks the offence, 
19. Balakrishna, J.I.L.I. Vol. 13, 1973. 
20. D.D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India. 
21. (1914) 59 L. Ed. 446. 
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the other remits punishment. Amnesty is usually addressed 
to classes or even communities. The function is exercised 
when it overlooks the offence and the offender leaving both 
in oblivion". 
22 
In re-Ohannugadu case where on the occasion of the 
formation of the s t a t e of A.P. the Governor without reference 
to any provision of law issued an order granting amnesty to 
condemned p r i s o n e r s . The court held tha t under Ar t i c le 72 and 
161 the head of s t a t e i s given author i ty by means of an 
executive act to tender pardons and reprieves and those 
functions can be exercised even before conviction. How fa r 
a general j a i l del ivery i s wise, j u s t i f i ed or expedient in 
circumstances prevai l ing in the country i s a matter of perfect ly 
within the d i sc re t ion and decision of the executive au tho r i t i e s 
and need not to be discussed or decided by the court of law 
whose functions are ent i re ly jud ic i a l* 
The courts In India have distinguished the pardon and 
amnesty recognizing the different effect of both as wel l . 
In I^eputy Inspector General of Pol ice . Horth Ranffl 
Waltair and other v . Ra.1a Bam case the fac ts in b r ie f of 
which are as fol lows: 
22. 1954 Cr. L . J . 1370 (Mad.) 
23 . A.I.R. I960 Andhra Pradesh 259. 
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A Sub-Inspector of Police and some otber Constables 
(respondents) were dismissed from service as they were convic-
ted of offences involving moral turpitude under Section 331» 
348 e t c . of I.P.O. and were awarded various terms of imprison-
ment. They f i led an sppeal against their convictions in the 
High Court of Madras. Pending the appeal Andhra State was 
formed in Ootober 1933. In 1934 Grovemment of Andhra State 
declared a general amnesty to a l l the prisoners by an order 
No. 26, Law Department. The respondents were some of those 
who bad the benefit of that order. Immediately thereafter 
the respondent asked the concerned authorities for postings 
upon beg told they were already dismissed from services . 
They moved to the High Court under Article 225. 
Court held that on the construction of the general 
pardon (amnesty) not pardon» i t did not purport to afford 
any pardon under Article 161 but was limited to Ifae remission 
of sentences or had a limited operation. That the prisoners 
were absolved only from the punishment that was infl icted on 
them but not from the other penal consequences following from 
the conviction. 
Chsmdra Reddy, C.J. "It i s true the word general amnesty 
were employed in the preamble to that order that expression may 
lead to some counterance to the argument that what was granted 
was a general pardon. Since the meaning of the word amnesty 
i s a general pardon. But that does not afford us much guidance 
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in deciding tbe exact scope of notification. It is plain 
from the concerned notification that the prisoners in the 
various Jails in the state of Andhra were to be released to 
celebrate inaugration of Andhra state. The subsequent order 
•akes it clear that what was remitted was the unexpired 
position. 
He further said that we could not also over rule the 
fact that Section 401 Or.P.O. under which order for release 
were to be promulgated is cited. This notification does not 
purport to afford any pardon to the prisoner nor does it make 
any reference to Article 161 of the constitution. Thus the 
order of the government in question is limited to the remission 
of sentences wholly and has a limited operation. That cannot 
24 be equated to a pardon". 
The court relied upon the U.S. and English cases that 
"the pardon (U.S. Supreme Court) if granted after conviction 
It removes the penalties and disabilities and restoires blm all 
bis civil rights; it makes him, as it were a new man and gives 
25 him a new credit and capacity". 
The pardon granted under that amnesty was the subject 
of frequent consideration by American Courts. Having regard 
to the term of such a proclamation, it was decided in 
24. A.I.R. 1960 A.P. p. 262 
25. Be Parte Garland v. Wallance 333 (l867) 
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26 
Saote T. U«S« that grant of suoh a pardon would result in 
the blotting out of the offence and that thereafter the 
convicted person could asserts all bis legal rights, since it 
removed all the penalities of the offence. He may usefully 
refer to the dictum of Field J. who delivered the opinion of 
the court in this context : 
"A pardon is an act of grace by which an offender is 
released from the consequences of his offence, so far as such 
release is practicable and within control of pardoning power 
or of officers under its direction. It releases the offenders 
from all disabilities Imposed by the offence and restores to 
him all bis civil rights* In contemplation of law, it so 
far blots out the offence, that afterwards it cannot be 
Imputed to him to prevent the assertion of his legal rights". 
27 In Hay Vo Justices of Tower Division of London , Hawkins 
J. said that directly the crime of which a man had been convicted 
was pardoned, he was absolved not only from the punishment 
inflicted on him by the judge, who pronounced sentence, but 
from all penal consequences such as disqualification from 
following his occupation* 
The first case in which the Supreme Court got an 
opportunity to express its opinion on pardoning power of the 
26. 1877 24 L. Ed. 42. 
27. 1890 24 Q.B.D. 561* 
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executive waa that of K.M» Nanavatl . The facts of the case 
are as follows: 
The petitioner was second in command of I.N.S. Mjsore 
which came to Bombay in the beginning of March 1959. There 
he was arrested on a charge of murder under Section 302 I.P.C. 
and was placed and continued to remain in naval custody all 
along during his trial. He was convicted by the High Court 
and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. With a view to 
filing an appeal in the Supreme Court, he applied to the 
High Court for a grant of certificate that the case was fit 
one for appeal to Supreme Court. The High Court however, 
reelected his application. So he applied to Supreme Court 
for granting special leave to appeals Meanwhile the Governor 
of Bombay issued an order suspending the sentence of Nanavatl 
Immediately after it had been passed and the suspension was to 
remain operative till the Supreme Court had taken decision on 
the application for special leave filed by Nanavatl. Rule 5 
of the Supreme Court rules has a provision that a person 
desirous of obtaining special leave to sgppeal must first 
surrender to his sentence and to the authority which is 
competent to keep him in safe custody. Since Nanavatl bad 
not done so the question arose whether his petition could be 
heard without his having complied with rule 5. It was urged 
on behalf of Nanavatl that the power of granting pardon 
28. K.M. Nanavatl v. State of Bombay. (1981) 1 SCC 497 
48 
which the Governor enjoys was unlimited and, therefore, the 
GoverBor could pass the sentence and having done so there was 
no sentence in existence any more and so rule 5 of Supreme 
Court was not attracted. 
But the Supreme Court held by majority (Kapur J. 
dissenting) that Governor had no power to grant the suspension 
of sentence for a period during which ibe matter was subjudice 
in this courto The Governor's order suspending the sentence 
could only operate until the matter become subjudice in this 
court on the filing of the petition of special leave to appeal 
whereupon this court being in seisin of the matter could 
consider whether OXXXI, rule 3 should be applied on the peti-
tioner exempted from the operation thereof as prayed for. 
Sinba, C.J. speaking on behalf of majority said that if 
the power of the Governor under Article 161 could operate also 
while the Supreme Court is seized of the matter then both the 
executive and the judiciary have to function in the same field 
at the same time. Merely because one power is executive and 
the other judicial it be held that they do not act in the same 
field; the field is the same, namely suspension of the sentence 
passed on a convicted person* 
He further said both the Articles 161 and H 2 contain no 
words of limitation and the field covered by them are also 
unfettered. If there is any field common to both, the principle 
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of 'harmonious const ruct ion ' w i l l have to be adopted in order 
to avoid conf l ic t between the two powers. The ambit of Art ic le 
161 i s very much wider and i t i s only in a narrow f i e ld that the 
power contained in i t i s also contained in Ar t ic le 142, namely 
the power of suspension of sentence during the period when the 
Supreme Court i s seized of the matter and i t i s sub^udice on 
the p r inc ip le of 'harmonious cons t ruc t ion ' and to asroid confl ict 
between the two i t must be held t h a t Art icle 161 does not deal 
with the suspension of sentence during the time Ar t i c l e 14-2 i s 
in operation and the matter i s subjudice. 
The fur ther contention that Rule 5 of 0 21 , framed 
under the rule making powers of the Supreme Court under 
Ar t i c l e 145 i s only subsidiary l eg i s l a t i on and so must yield 
to the powers under Art ic le I6l i s not cor rec t . 
The court fur ther held tha t "the prerogative i s no 
longer then the law allows" and was observed tha t in f ac t , we 
apprehend to enter ing in to an elaborate discussion about the 
scope and effect of the said' large power in the l i g h t of the 
re levan t ;judicial decisions i s l i ke ly to create confusion, 
Kapur, J . in his dissent ing opinion held t ha t the word 
' a t any time' in Section 401, Gr.P.C. are very wide and show 
the plenary nature of the power. The powers of the Governor 
under Art icle 161 i s of the widest amplitude as the words of 
the Art ic le would show. In construing a const i tuent or an 
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organic s t a tu te as the cons t i tu t ion of India, that i n t e rp re t a -
t ion must be attached which i s moat beneficial to the widest 
amplitude of i t s power. 
He fur ther held that the h is tory of pardons, reprieves 
e t c , shows tha t the power of the executive in tha t sphere i s 
of the widest amplitude, plenary in nature and can be exercised 
a t any time a f t e r the offence - before or during t r i a l , a f ter 
judgment and before, during and a f t e r disposal of the appealo 
The said power i s sought to be cut down by reference to 
Section 426, the appel la te court can only suspend the sentence 
•for reasons s t a t e d ' no such l imi ta t ion is placed in Section 401. 
The court act ing j ud i c i a l l y under Ar t i c l e 142, take only those 
f a c t s into considerat ion which are suff ic ient in -toe jud ic ia l 
sense to jus t i fy the exercise of i t s power, so would be the 
case when the power i s exercised under the ru l e s of the cour t . 
29 Kapur, J . observed: I have bad the advantage of reading 
the order proposed by my Lord the C . J , , but I regre t I am unable 
to agree with i t and I proceed to give my reasons . In this 
p e t i t i o n which i s brought for exemption from surrender to the 
sentence imposed on the p e t i t i o n e r a question of great cons t i tu -
t i o n a l importance a r i s e s . The p e t i t i o n e r submits tha t his 
sentence having been suspended by the order of the Governor of 
the erstwhile State of Bombay, the rule made by t h i s court as 
29. S.C.J. (1961) 11 p . 117. 
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to surrender which i s a condition precedent to the hearing of 
a p e t i t i o n for leave to appeal against the judgment of the 
High Court i s inapplicable to him and that i t i s a f i t case in 
which he should be exempted from the operation of the ru l e . 
However, t h i s judgment was severely c r i t i c i s e d by 
•50 H.M. Seervai . He said that the Supreme Court by majority, 
temporarily departed from the s e t t l e d law r e l a t i n g to the 
pardoning power and from se t t l ed pr inc ip les of construct ion, 
i t could have been safely asser ted tha t the law was well 
s e t t l e d not only in England and America, but also in India. 
He cal led Nanavati case as an off-shoot of a sensat ional 
murder t r i a l in Bombay which arosed great public in t e res t 
and the same i n t e r e s t was arosed when (Jovernor of Bombay 
suspended the sentence passed on Nana^ati t i l l the disposal 
by Supreme Court. He has quoted the words of Holmes J . saying 
that Nanavati case has also a t ta ined the digni ty of 'great 
case* . "Great cases , l ike hard cases , makes bad law. For 
grea t cases are cal led great , not by reason of t h e i r rea l 
importance in shaping the law of the nature , but because of 
some accident of immediate overwhelming in t e re s t which appeals 
to the feel ings and d i s t o r t s the judgment. These immediate 
i n t e r e s t s exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes 
what previously was c lear seem doubtful and before which even 
30. Seervai, H.M, "Consti tut ional Law of India", p . 1755^ 
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well se t t led p r inc ip l e s of law w i l l bend". 
I t i s submitted that the p r inc ip le of harmonious construc-
t ion was c lea r ly misapplied, because the majority judgment 
created disharmony between two cons t i tu t iona l provisions where 
none exis ted . Before pr inc ip le of harmonious construction can 
came into play, an attempt must f i r s t be made to see whether a 
con f l i c t between two cons t i tu t iona l provisions i s apparent or 
r e a l . 
In the same year and almost under the same bench another 
case Sarat Chandra Rabba^^. came before the Supreme Court to 
consider the opinion upon the execut ive ' s pardoning power. In 
t h i s case the d i s t inc t ion drawn by Kapur J . in Nanavati case 
between executive and jud ic ia l control over sentences was 
affirmed. The f ac t s of the case are as follows: 
The a p p e l l a n t ' s nomination paper for e lec t ion to the 
Assam Legis la t ive Assembly was re jected by the Returning Officer 
on the ground of d i squa l i f ica t ion under Section 7(b) of the 
Presentat ion of People Act, 1951, in that he had been convicted 
and sentence to three years regrous imprisonment under Section 
4(b) of the Explosive Substance Act (VI of 1908) and five years 
had not expired a f t e r his r e l ea se . The appellant had applied 
to the Election Commission for removing the said d isqual i f ica t ion 
3 1 . Hortbem Secur i t i es Co. v. U.S. 
32. ^ara t Chandra Rabha v . Kbagendragadker Natb (1961 ) 2 S.C.R. 
133. 
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but i t had refused to do so. The appellant sentence was 
however, remitted by the Government of Assam under Section 4-01 
of the Criminal Procedure Code. And the period in which he 
was ac tua l ly in j a i l was less then two yeara. The Election 
Tribunal held that the nomination paper had been improperly 
r e j ec t ed and set aside the elect ion but the High Court taking 
a contrary view dismissed the e lec t ion p e t i t i o n . 
The question before the court was whether the order of 
remission has the effect of reducing the sentence in the same 
way in which an order of an appel la te or a rev i s lona l court 
has ef fect of reducing the sentence passed by the t r i a l court 
to the extent indicated in the order of the appellate or 
r e v i s i o n a l cour t . 
The Supreme Court held tha t the legal effect of the 
j u d i c i a l reduction of a sentence and an executive remission 
of t h a t sentence was en t i re ly d i f f e r e n t . I t observed tha t the 
order of remission merely means tha t the res t of the sentence 
need not be undergone, leaving the order, of the conviction by 
the court and the sentence passed by i t untouched. 
The main contention on behalf of the appellant i s that 
High Court was wrong in coming to the conclusion tha t the 
nomination paper of the appellant was properly rejected under 
Section 7(b) of the Act of Representation of People 1951. 
Wanchoo J . , who delivered the unanimous opinion of the 
cour t held that the term of the Section 7(b) were sa t i s f i ed and 
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the appellant being a person convicted and sentenced to three 
years imprisonment was disqualified from contesting an election. 
Wanchoo, J. observed: "Now it is not disputed that in 
England and India the effect of a pardon or what is sometimes 
called a free pairdon is to clear a person from all consequences 
of the offence for which it is granted and from all statutory 
or other disqualifications following upon conviction. It makes 
him as it were a new man ^ut the same effect does not 
follow on a mere remission which stands on a different footing 
altogether. 
The scope of Article 72 came up before the Supreme Court 
34-for determination in the infamous Billa-Ranga case . The facts 
of the case are briefed as follows: 
Kuljeet Singh (Ranga) and Jasbir Singh (Billa) hatched a 
plan that they would offer a lift in their car to some young 
children try to extort ransom from their parents by kidnapping 
them, and if their scheme ran into difficulties, to kill the 
children. The two children happened to be Gita and her brother 
Sanjay. On 26th August, 1978, in New Delhi they kidnapped these 
two Gita and Sanjay; children of naval officer and committed 
35. (1961) 2 S.G.R. 133. 
34. Kuljeet Singh v. Lt. Governor of Delhi. 1981 A.I.R. 
S.O. 1572. 
55 
murders of both a f te r committing rape on Gita Chopra. They 
were decoyed in to a car under the pretext of giving them a 
l i f t ; but once in the ca r , they res is ted and cried out for 
he lp . A public sp i r i t ed c i t i z e n gave chase, but the car 
broke through the t r a f f i c l i g h t s and escaped. They were 
b ru t a l l y murdered by Ranga and B i l l a . They were tr ied for 
murder and D i s t r i c t Judge sentenced them to death . The 
sentence was confirmed by High Court. Thereupon they presen-
ted a specia l leave pe t i t ion to Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court dismissed the appeal . Sanga and B i l l a had presented 
meitjy p e t i t i o n s to the President to commute t h e i r death 
sentence. 
While the pe t i t i ons were pending Ranga presented a wri t 
35 pe t i t ion to Uae Supreme Court - Kul.leet Singh case , i nv i t ing 
the Supreme Court to reappraise his case and reconsider the 
dismissal of h i s special leave p e t i t i o n . Chandrachud, C.J. 
(for himself, A.F. Sen and Baharul Islam, J J ) held the accused 
were profess ional murderers and deserve no sympathy even in 
term of evolving standards of decency of a maturing soc ie ty . 
Their inhumanity defied a l l be l ief and desc r ip t ion . The death 
sentenced imposed upon them was, therefore , upheld. Chandrachud, 
C.J . expressed the hope that the President would dispose of the 
mercy pe t i t ions expedi t iously . 
35 . (1981) A.I.R. S.C. 1572, 
56 
Meanwhile the mercy of Ranga was rejected by the President 
Upon th i s Kuljeet Singh f i led a wri t pe t i t ion contending that 
the power conferred by Article 72 on the President to grant 
pardons and to commute sentences> especial ly the sentence of 
dea th , was a power coupled with a duty which must be f a i r l y and 
reasonably exercised. Chandrachud, C.J. observed tha t the court 
did not know whether the Government of India had formulated any 
uniform standard or guideline by which the exercise of the 
power under Article 72 was intended to be, or was in f a c t , 
guided. 
The question raised by Mr. Garg for the pe t i t i one r was 
of "far reaching importance" and the p e t i t i o n was fixed for 
f i n a l hearing in the second week of Jcoiuary 1982. Meanwhile 
the execution of Ranga and Bi l l a was stayed, and in order to 
obviate the necessi ty of persons. Similarly si tuated f i l i n g 
wri t p e t i t i o n s , the court directed tha t "the death sentence 
Imposed on any person whatsoever whose pe t i t i on was re jected 
under Ar t i c l e 72 or 161 of the Const i tu t ion, should not be 
executed u n t i l the disposal of th i s writ p e t i t i o n " . 
37 F ina l ly , however, when the writ pe t i t i on came before 
the bench for hearing on January 20, 1982, Supreme Court 
speaking through Chandrachud, C.J. (0. Chinnappa Reddy and 
36. Kul.1eet Singh v , L t . Governor of Delhi ( l98 l ) , A.I.R. S.C. 
2239. 
37. A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 774. 
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A.P. Sen, J J . ) observedt In the in s t an t case, since the accused 
had committed cold-blooded murders with professional stamp, the 
only sentence which could possibly be imposed upon him was that 
of death and no circumstances existed for in terference with that 
sentence . I t could no t , therefore , be said tha t a refusing to 
commute the sentence of death in to a l e s se r sentence, the 
Pres iden t has in any manner transgressed his d iscre t ionary power 
under Art ic le 72. Whatever be the guideline observed for exercise 
of the power conferred by Art ic le 72. The question whatever the 
Government of India has formulated any uniform standard or guide-
l i n e s by which cons t i tu t iona l power under Art ic le 72 or 161 can 
be exercised l e f t open, hence general order of stay of execution 
of death sentence i s vacated. 
I t fur ther observed tha t the present pe t i t ion did not 
provide such occasion, because whatever be the guidel ines 
observed for the exercise of such power conferred by Art icle 72 
the only sentence which could possibly be imposed on Ranga was 
t h a t of death and no circumstance existed for interference with 
such sentence. I t i s indeed encouraging that the "appropriate 
occasion" did eventually come and the court was not overawed by 
the victim of crime. 
However, the observation of the court in t h i s case and 
the stay of execution was c r i t i c i s e d as i t was wrong to have 
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given stay to the execution of death penalty of a convict l ike 
Ranga whose p e t i t i o n s had been e a r l i e r dismissed by the court 
not once but twice. The e a r l i e r observations of the court on 
21st Apri l , 1981, when i t dismissed the writ pe t i t i on of Ranga 
to the effect , "we hope that the President wi l l dispose of the 
mercy pe t i t ion s ta ted to have been f i l ed by the p e t i t i o n e r as 
expedi t iously as be finds i t convenient", were on« can not 
help thinking pregnant meaning. Hence one fee l s that the s tory 
of execution granted on t h i s background was perplexing. Decisions 
l i k e these do not heighten the c o u r t ' s image. 
th i s Some unusual testWrea in / case are that the p e t i t i o n e r 
Kuljeet Singh was produced before the learned judges - a 
proceeding described by Chandrachud, CJ, himself as a somewhat 
"unusual exercise" and question on matters bearing on the 
question of sentence the answer given by the p e t i t i o n e r , the 
learned C J . says, furnish no mater ial a t a l l for jus t i fy ing 
the reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for l i f e . 
We do not know under what provisions of law the p e t i t i o n e r could 
be personal ly examined although we are told that counsels for 
the Government were present unless i t was for e lucidat ing any 
•59 
statement made in the p e t i t i o n . 
38 . Dhelryasbeel v . Pa t i l (P res iden t ' s Power to pardon and judiciary Cr i . L . J . 1982 (AP) 88 Cr i . L .J . p . 10) . 
39 . P res iden t ' s power of pardon, Edi tor ia l 1981-82, 86 CWN 
p . 52. 
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Another unusual feature was allowing newspapermen to 
interview the condemned pr i soners . The j a i l code of course 
allowed friends and r e l a t i ve s to see the condemned men for the 
l a s t time to bid them farewell . Mr. J . Sen and Mr. Ju s t i ce 
Baharul Islam are reported to have said that they did not see 
why newspapermen and journa l i s t could not be termed as friends 
of s o c i e t y . We do not think the newspapermen wanted to see the 
pr i soner to bid them farewel l . They were then to regale t h e i r 
readers and to ca te r to the morbid cu r ios i ty of the masses 
fo r d e t a i l s of the operat ion. However, in the words of H.K. 
4-0 
Seervai , if our reading of the judgment of Ghandrachud, C.J. 
is correct, the judgment clearly reached the right conclusion. 
The power to grant remission, commutation or suspension 
of sentences has been given to the government concerned under 
Sections 432 to 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
While doing so, the appropriate government may take into account 
the opinion of the judge who passed such a sentence but that is 
not obligatory nor is such an opinion binding on the government. 
Wider powers have been given to the President by Article 
72 of the constitution. However, more or less same powers have 
been given to Goveimors under Article 161 of the constitution. 
The power of the President under Article 72 of the constitution 
is not conflicting with the power of the concerned government 
40. H.H. Seervai, "Constitutional Law of India", Vol. Ila 
1770. 
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under Sections 4-32-435 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 
In Maru Ram case , it was contended that by the intro-
duction of Section 433A^^, Section 432 is excluded for certain 
clauses of lifers and Section 433A suffers eclipse. Since 
Section 432 and 433A are statutory expressions and modus 
operandi of the constitutional power, Section 433A would be 
ineffective because it detracts from the operation of Section 
432 and 433(a) which are legislative subbogates, as it were of 
the pardon under the constitution. 
But the Supreme Court while speaking through Chandrachud, 
C.J. and Bhagwati and Krishna Iyer, JJ (Koshal, J. concurring) 
held that, although the power under Article 72 or 161 which 
is constitutional and that under 432 and 433(a), which is 
statutory, may be similar but they are not the same or identical, 
The two powers differ in their source, substance and strength. 
The constitutional power is untouchable and unapproachable and 
can not suffer the vicissitudes of simple legislative processes. 
41. Maru Ram v. Union of India. 1981 S.C.R. 107. 
42. Section 433A - "Notwithstanding anything contained in 
Section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life 
is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for 
which death is one of the punishments provided by law, 
or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been 
commuted under Section 433 into one of imprisonmen 1a for 
life, such person shall not be released from prison 
unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprison-
ment. 
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Therefore, Section 4-33A can not be inval idated as i nd i r ec t ly 
v io la t ive ol Article 72 and 161. What the code gives, i t can 
take , and so an embargo on Sections 4-32 and 4-33A i s with the 
l e g i s l a t i v e power of the parliament. 
The manner about the exercis ing of th i s power 
Chandrachud, CJ, observed : "In exercis ing th i s power the 
Govenaor or the President act and must act not on t h e i r own 
judgment but in accordance with ttie aid and advice of t h e i r 
Council of Minis ters , But a l l public power, including 
cons t i t u t i ona l power, sha l l never be exercisable a r b i t r a r i l y , 
gu ide l ines for f a i r and equal execution are guarantors of the 
val id play of power' .n 43 
According to the Supreme Court, pe t i t i ons f i led under 
A r t i c l e 72 and 161 of the const i tu t ion or under Section 4-32 
and 433 must be disposed of expedi t ious ly . This was observed 
44 in Sber Singh case T The facts of which in brief are as 
fo l lows : 
The petitioner Sher Singh and Surjet Singh and one 
Kuldip Singh were convicted under Section 302 read with 
Section 34 I.P.C. were sentenced to death by the learned 
Sessions Judge, Sangrur on November 26, 1977. By a judgment 
dated July 18, 1978, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana 
43. 1981 S.C.C. p. 115. 
44. Sher Singh v . Sta te of Punjab. 1983 A.I.R. S.C. 465. 
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reduced the sentence imposed upon Kuldlp Singh to l i f e impri-
sonment but upheld the sentence of death imposed upon the 
p e t i t i o n e r . The court dismissed the special leave pe t i t ion 
f i l ed by the p e t i t i o n e r on March 15, 1979. The p e t i t i o n e r 
then f i l ed a virit pe t i t i on in t h i s court challenging the 
v a l i d i t y of 302 of I .P .C, that pe t i t i on was dismissed on 
January 20, 1981, Review pe t i t ion f i l ed by the p e t i t i o n e r 
aga ins t dismisaal of t h e i r special leave pe t i t ion was dismissed 
by t h i s court on March 27, 1981. After f a i l i ng in these 
seemingly Inexhaustible se r ies of proceedings the p e t i t i o n e r 
f i l e d these two wri t pe t i t i ons on March 1983, basing themselves 
on the decisions rendered by Jus t i ce Chinnappa Reddy cuad 
4-5 J u s t i c e R.B. Misra, on February 16, 1983, Vatheeswaran. 
Cbandrachud, C . J , , observed : "We must take the opportu-
n i t y to impress upon the Goverament of India and the State 
Government t ha t pe t i t i ons f i led under Ar t ic le 72 and 161 of 
the cons t i tu t ion or under Sections 432 - 4-33 of Cr.P.C. must 
be disposed of expedi t iously . A self imposed rule should be 
followed by the executive au tho r i t i e s rigorously that every 
such pe t i t ion should be disposed of within a period of three 
months from the date on which i t i s received. Long and 
terminable delays in the disposal of these pe i t ions are a 
serious hurdle in the dispensation of j u s t i c e and indeed such 
45 . Delay exceeding two years in the execution of sentence of 
death should be considered suff ic ient to e n t i t l e the 
person under sentence of death to invoke Art icle 21 and 
demand the quashing of the sentence of death . 
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delays tend to shake the confidence of the people in the very 
system of J u s t i c e . 
A pernicious impression seems to be growing that whatever 
the courts may decide, one can always turn to the executive for 
defeat ing the verdict of the court by r e s to r ing to delaying 
t a c t i c s* 
I t was fur ther said tha t delay in executing a death 
sentence i s inquestionably an important consideration for 
determining whether death sentence should be allowed to be 
executed. But according to us , no hard and f a s t rule can be 
Isd-d down as our learned breathren have done. 
And f i na l l y question of the scope of Art ic le 72 again 
46 
came before the Supreme Court in Kebar Singh case . The fac ts 
of which iao br ief are as fol lows: 
On 22nd January, 1986, Kehar Singh was convicted of an 
offence under Section 120-B read with Section 302 of the Indian 
Penal Code, in connection with the assass inat ion of Smt. Indira 
Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, on 31st October, 1984, 
and was sentenced to death by the learned Additional Sessions 
Judge, New Delhi . His appeal was dismissed by the High Court 
of Delhi, and his subsequent appeal by spec ia l leave to t h i s 
court was dismissed on 3rd August, 1988. A review pe t i t ion 
4-6. Kehar Singh v. Union of India. A.I .R. 1989, S.G. 653, 
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filed thereafter by Kehar Singh was dismissed on 7th September, 
1988 and later a writ petition was also dismissed by this court. 
On 14th October, 1988, his son Rajinder Singh presented 
a petition to the President of India, under Article 72 of the 
constitution. In that petition reference was made to the 
evidence on the record of the criminal case and it was sought 
to be established that Kehar Singh was innocent, and that the 
verdict of the courts that Kehar Singh was guilty was erroneous. 
It was argued that it was a case of clemency. The petition 
included a prayer that Kehar Singh's representative may be 
allowed to see the President in person in order to explain the 
case concerning him. The petition was accompanied by extracts 
of the oral evidence recorded by the trial court. On 23rd 
October, 1988, Counsel for Kehar Singh wrote to the President 
requesting an opportunity to present the case before him and 
for the grant of a hearing in the matter. A letter dated 31st 
October, 1988, was received from the Secretary to the President 
referring to the mercy petition and mentioning that in accordance 
with "the well established practice in respect of consideration 
of mercy petitions, it has not been possible to accept the 
request for a hearing". On 3rd November, 1988, a further 
letter was addressed to the President by Counsel refusing the 
existence of any practice not to accord a hearing on a petition 
under Article 72 and requesting him to reconsider his decision 
to deny a hearing on November 15, 1988, the Secretary to the 
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President wrote to Counsel as fol lows: 
"Reference i s invited to your l e t t e r dated November 3 , 
1988, on the subject mentioned above. The l e t t e r has been 
perused by the President and i t s contents were careful ly con-
s idered . The President i s of the opinion tha t he cannot go 
in to the merits of a case f i na l ly decided by the highest Court 
of the l and . Pe t i t ion for grant of pardon on behalf of Shri 
Kehar Singh wi l l be dea l t with in accordance with the provisions 
of the Constitution of India" . 
Thereafter the President rejected the pe t i t ion under 
Ar t i c l e 72o On 24th November, 1988, Kehar Singh was infoirmed 
of the re jec t ion of the p e t i t i o n . His son Rajinder Singh, 
i t i s said, came to know on 30th November, 1988, from the 
newspaper media tha t the date of execution of Kehar Singh has 
been fixed for 2nd December, 1988, The next day* 1st December, 
1988, he f i l ed a pe t i t i on in the High Court of Delhi praying 
for an order r e s t r a in ing the respondents from executing the 
sentence of death, and on the afternoon of the same day the 
High Court dismissed the p e t i t i o n . Immediately upon dismissal 
of the p e t i t i o n . Counsel moved to the Supreme Court and subse-
quently f i l ed special leave pe t i t ion in the court along with 
wr i t pe t i t i on no. 526-27 of 1988 under Ar t ic le 32 of the 
Cons t i tu t ion . 
During the preliminary hearing l a t e in the afternoon 
of the same day i . e . 1st December, 1988, the Supreme Court 
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decided to entertain the writ petition and made an order direc-
ting that the execution of Kehar Singh should not be carried out 
meanwhile. 
The questions that came up for determination by the court 
in Kehar Singh's case were: 
1o Could the President under Article 72 of the constitution 
go into the merits of the case finally decided by the court? 
2« Whether judicial review extends to an esamination of the 
order passed by the President under Article 72 of the constitu-
tion? 
3. Whether an oral hearing should be offered to the peti-
tioner while the President is exercising his powers under 
Article 72? 
4« What are the guidelines to be followed for regulating 
the exercise of this power under Article 72 in order to preven t 
an arbitrary exercise of power? 
5. The constitutional validity of the death sentence. 
The Supreme Court was of the view that pardon is a part 
of the constitutional scheme and it should be treated so in the 
Indian Republic. It has been reposed by the people through the 
constitution in the Head of State and enjoys a high status. It 
is open to the President in exercise of the powers vested in 
him by Article 72 to scrutinize the evidence on record of the 
criminal case and come to a different conclusion from that 
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recorded by the court in regard to the g u i l t and the sentence 
imposed on the accused. In doing so, the President does not 
amend or modify or supercede the j u d i c i a l record. The j u d i c i a l 
record remains in tact and undisturbed. The President ac ts on a 
wholly d i f fe ren t plane in which the court ac ted . He acts under 
a cons t i t u t i ona l power, the nature of which i s en t i re ly d i f f e r en t 
from the j u d i c i a l power and cannot be regarded as extension of 
i t . ind t h i s i s so, notwithstanding the p r ac t i c a l effect of 
the p r e s i d e n t i a l act to remove the stigma of g u i l t from the 
accused or to remit the sentence imposed on him. 
The power under Ar t ic le 72 e n t i t l e the President to 
examine the record of evidence of the cr iminal case and to 
determine for himself whether the case i s one deserving the 
grant of the r e l i e f f a l l i n g within that power "notwithstanding 
that i t has been jud i c i a l l y concluded by the consideration 
given to i t by th i s cour t" . 
With regard to the second question, the court made i t 
c lear tha t the question was only confined to the area and 
scope of the Pres iden t ' s power and did not extend to whether 
the power had been t ru ly exercised on mer i t s . I t has been 
held that the question as to the area of the Pres iden t ' s power 
under Ar t ic le 72 f a l l s squarely within the j ud i c i a l domain and 
can be examined by the courts by way of j u d i c i a l review. 
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Although it was categorically stated that the court was 
Dot going into the question as to whether the President's power 
had been truly exercised on the merits, it did observed that 
"we think that the order of the President cannot be subjected 
to judicial review on its merits except within the defined 
limitations". 
The question whether an oral hearing should be extended 
by the President while exercising his power under Article 72. 
It was held that the matter lies entirely at the discretion of 
the President and the condemned person has no right to insist 
on an oral hearing before the President. The proceeding before 
the President is of an executive character and it is for the 
petitionee to submit all requisite Information to the President 
for disposal of the petition. The President may consider 
sufficient all the material placed before him or he may send 
for further material relevant on the issue if he thinks it is 
pertinent and he may give an oral hearing to the parties if he 
considers it will assist him in dealing with the petition. In 
other words it is for the President to decide how best to 
acquaint himself with all the information necessary for a proper 
and effective disposal of the petition. 
About the question of guidelines to exercise the power 
under Article 72, the court held that it seems to us that there 
is sufficient indication in the term of Article 72 and in the 
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history of the power enshrined In that proylslons as well as 
existing case lawt and specific guidelines need not be spelled 
out. Indeed it may not be possible to lay down any precise, 
clearly defined and sufficiently channelised guidelines»for 
we must remember that the power under Article 72 is of the 
widest amplitudef can contemplate a myriad kinds and catagories 
of cases with facts and situations varying from case to case 
in which the merits and reasons of state may be profoundly 
assisted by prevailing occasions and passing time. And it is 
of great significance that the function itself enjoys high 
status in the constitutional scheme. 
As the constitutional validity of the death sentence was 
47 
upheld in Bachan Singh case . the court felt bound by the earlier 
decision point. It, therefore, declined to open the question 
again although great emphasis was laid on the dissenting judgment 
given by Justice Bhagwati in Bachan Singh's case. 
The judgment has set to rest doubts raised by the President 
that his decision on a matter finally decided by the highest court 
of land would be construed as a conflicting action between the 
executive and judiciary. 
As President expressed his opinion that he cannot go into 
the merits of the case finally decided by the highest court of 
land. 
47. Bachan Sinp;b v. State of Punjab. 1983, AIR SO 465. 
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The Supreme Court expressed the view tha t i t i s open to 
the President in the exercise of the power vested in him by 
A r t i c l e 72 of the cons t i tu t ion to sc ru t in i se the evidence on 
the record of the criminal case and come to a d i f fe ren t conclusion 
The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l bench dec is ion , however, s t i l l lef t the 
doors of debate open to the question of the government's guide-
l i n e s , if any, by which the cons t i t u t i ona l power under Art ic le 72 
can be exercised though i t has held i t to be of f a r reaching 
importance, when i t considered the Billa-fianga case in 1981. 
A cross-sect ion of eminent j u r i s t s interviewed, said that 
they had no knowledge of any guidelines but had various sugges-
t ions to make. The majority of them were of the opinion that 
s ince the power of pardon i s execut ive, the govemmen t which 
recommends mercy to President could take into consideration a 
va r i e ty of f ac to r s not jud ic i a l ly tenable , l ike 'publ ic opinion' 
48 
aga ins t an execution. 
The Supreme Court advocate, Mr. Venogopal, Senior Counsel 
Mr. Ram Jethmalani, cons t i tu t iona l expert Dr. L.M. Singhvi 
concurred on t h i s a spec t . However, a noted j u r i s t Mr. Y.S. 
Chi ta le voiced his dissent on the issue of public opinion play-
ing a par t in the considera t ions . 
According to the Br i t i sh Home Office which deposed before 
the Royal Commission on cap i ta l punishment whose subsequent 
48 . Times of India , December 24, 1988. 
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exhaustive report of 1949-53 led to the aboli t ion of death 
pena l ty , there are three ' r a r e ' clashes of case in which 
rep r i eve may be granted. The report said that there had been 
occasional cases in Br i t i sh when i t had been f e l t r igh t to 
commute the sentence of death in deference to a widely spread 
or s t rong local expression of public opinion on the ground i t 
would do more harm than good to carry out the sentence, if the 
r e s u l t was to arose sympathy for the offender and h o s t i l i t y to 
the law". 
Kehar Singh's Counsel Mr. Ram Jethmalani, said commuta-
t ion of death sentence on the bas is of strong public opinion 
was a well known ground in countr ies the world over. Constitu-
t i o n a l expert Mr. Y.S. Chitale i s of the view that evidence 
which had not been considered by court and had surfaced l a t e r 
should be considered as v i t a l ground for commutation. He d i s -
agreed with the view of public opinion as 'an accused cannot 
be freed jus t on the basis of public opinion ' . 
In other misunderstandings of Pres ident ' s own power 
which was evident from the l e t t e r , and Mr. Jethmalani wanted 
the Supreme Couirt to c lar i fy was that there was a "well 
es tabl ished prac t ice of not bearing pe t i t i one r s by the 
Pres iden t , Even on f a c t s , t h i s statement was wrong. When 
Vijaya Laxmi Pandit was Governor of Maharashtra, an eminent 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t named Bhaiprasad Dial Das was convicted whereupon 
she sought a hearing, the Governor than appointed two Secretar ies 
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to bear him. After the hearing the convict was pardoned. 
Many others might have gone to the gallows since then labouring 
under the same misconception which the President himself was 
harbouringo But ignorance of one's r igh t s on the neglect to 
invoke them, would not make a well established p r a c t i c e " . 
The Supreme Court, while ru l ing tha t the convict had no 
r i g h t to in s i s t on presenting ora l arguments granted tha t 
Pres ident had wide power in choosing the manner of consideration 
of mercy p e t i t i o n . I t i s for him how best he can acquaint 
himself with a l l the information that i s necessary for i t s 
proper and effec t ive d isposal . 
C H A P T E R - I I I 
JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMINT 
UNITED STATES JUDICIAL ATTITUDE 
Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution 
provides that '•the President shall have power to grant reprieves 
and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in 
oases of impeachment". 
Pardoning power of the President of America has been 
held to "be governed by the same principles as are applicable 
to the exercise of the king's power of mercy under the English 
Constitution. 
In United States v. Wilson , Marshall, C.J., referring 
to the exercise of this power said: "As this power bad been 
exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation 
whose language is our and whose Judicial institutions ours 
bears a close resemblance; we adopt their books for the rules 
prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person 
who would avail himself of it". 
2 
Similar words were said by Wayne, J., in Ex Parte Well. 
He said: we still think so and that the language in the 
constitution, conferring the power to grant reprieves and 
pardons must be construed with reference to its meaning at the 
1. 8 L. ed. 64-0 at 643-44. 
2. 15 L. ed. 421 at 424. 
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time of i t s adoption. At the time of our separation from 
Great B r i t a i n , tha t povier had been exercised by the king, aa 
the Chief Executive. Pr ior to the revolut ion, the colonies 
being in effect under the laws of Qjgland, were accustomed to 
the exercise of i t in the various forms as they may be found 
in Ehglish books. They were, of course, to be applied as 
occasions occurred and they const i tuted a par t of the j u r i s -
prudence of inglo-America. At tha t time of the adoption of 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n , American Statemen were conversant with the 
prerogat ives exercised by the Crown. Hence when the words to 
grant pardons were used in the cons t i tu t ion , they convey to 
the mind the author i ty as exercised by the Br i t i sh Crown, or 
i t s represen ta t ives in the co lon ies . At that time both 
Englishmen and American attached the same meaning to the word 
'pardon*. In the convention which framed the cons t i tu t ion , no 
effor t was made to define or change i t s meaning, although i t 
was l imited in cases of impeachment. 
This view that pardon must be given the same meaning as 
was given to i t in Etagland and America when the const i tu t ion 
3 
was es tabl ished was again affirmed in Ex Parte GrossBian. 
Taft, C . J . , sa id : The language of the const i tu t ion can 
not be in terpre ted safely except by reference to the common 
law and to Br i t i sh i n s t i t u t i o n s as they were when the instrument 
3 . 69 Li ed. 527 at 530, 532 and 535. 
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was framed and adopted. The statesmen and layers of tbe 
conyentlont who submitted i t to tbe r a t i f i c a t i o n of the 
convention of the th i r teen s t a t e s , were bom and brought up 
in the atmosphere of the common law, aid thought and spoke 
in i t s vocabulary. They were fami l ia r with other forms of 
Governments recent and ancient and indicated in the i r discu-
ss ions earnest study and consideration of many of them, but 
when tbey came to put t h e i r conclusions in to the form of 
fundamental law in a compact d r a f t , they expressed them in 
terms of the common law confident that they could be short ly 
and earnest ly understood". 
The pardon except the pardon by s t a t u t e has to be 
pleaded and the plea of 'not g u i l t y ' a t t r i a l would be taken 
4 
as a waiver of the pardon. Further under the prerogat ive , a 
sentence of death i s commuted to one of t ranspor ta t ion or 
imprisonment through the machinery of a condi t ional pardon. 
In America for the f i r s t time the question arose tha t 
whether the acceptance of pardon i s necessary or no t . U.S. 
V. Wilson , Marshall , C ,J . , held tha t the acceptance of a 
pardon was necessary for i t s v a l i d i t y . He described the pardon 
as the p r iva te though o f f i c i a l , ac t of the executive magis t ra te , 
delivered to the individual for whose benefi t i t was intended 
4 . Halsbury, Vol. 10 p . 404 
5 , 1833 7 Pe t . 150, 8 L. ed, 64O, 644< 
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and not communicated o f f i c i a l ly to the cour t , of which therefore , 
i t wi l l take no no t i ce , for a court only looks with jud ic ia l 
eyes and can take no not ice j ud i c i a l l y of what ia not before i t . 
If pardon i s rejected by the person to whom i t i s tendered "we 
have discovered no power in a court to force i t in on him". 
In Burdick v . U.S», Marshal l ' s doctr ine was put to a t e s t 
7 
t h a t seems to have overtaxed i t , perhaps f a t a l l y . Burdick 
having declined to t e s t i fy before a Federal Grand Jury on the 
ground tha t bis testimony would tend to incriminate him, was 
preferred by President Wilson "a f u l l and unconditional pardon 
for a l l offences agains t the United S ta tes" which he might have 
attempted or par t i c ipa ted in , in connection with 1he matter he 
had been questioned about. Burdick refused to accept the peurdon 
and refused to t e s t i fy before the Grand Jury . The Supreme 
Court upheld h i s r ight to do so . McKenna J . remarking "the 
grace of pardon may be only in pretense involving consequences 
of even greater disgrace than those from which i t purports to 
r e l i e v e . However, Holmes, J . , upheld the r ight of the President 
to commute a sentence of death to one of l i f e imprisonment, 
against the w i l l of p r i soners . He said : A pardon in our days 
i s not a p r iva te act of grace from an individual happening to 
possess power. I t i s a par t of the cons t i tu t iona l scheme. When 
6. 1914, 236 U.S. 79, 59 L. ed. 476. 
7 . Corwin, p . 407. 
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granted i t i s the determination of the ult imate authori ty tha t 
the public welfare wi l l be b e t t e r served by i n f l i c t i n g l e s s 
8 
than what the judgment f ixed . 
The power of the U.S. President to grant reprieves and 
pardons for the offenses against the United S ta tes except in 
cases of impeachment was su f f i c ien t ly c l ea r to require l i t t l e 
or no i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , however, the questions of some importance 
have ar isen taken the form of other aspec ts . 
9 
As in Bid die v. Perovicjh , the question arosed tha t can 
a Federal convict be pardoned without his consent? In th i s 
case the convict , Perovich, having been sentenced to death for 
murder in Alaska, was granted executive clemency by President 
Taft in 1909 and his sentence commuted to imprisonment for 
l i f e . He was transferred from the Alaska J a i l to the Federal 
Peni ten t ia ry a t Leavenworth. After twice applying for a 
pardon which was denied, he secured a writ of habeas corpus 
on the ground tha t his removal to the Peni tent iary was i l l e g a l 
since h is consent. 
The Supreme Court held tha t the consent of the pr isoner 
was not an e s sen t i a l par t of any change in sentence under the 
P res iden t ' s pardoning power. The President ac t s for the public 
welfare and i n t e r e s t regardless of the wishes of the convict . 
8 . Biddle v . Perovich (1926) 274, U.S. 71 t . e d . 
9. 274, U.S. 480, 1927. 
-ACCNo 
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If Perovich did not accept the change of punishment from hanging 
to imprisonment he could not get himself hanged against the 
executive order for imprisonment. 
In another case of Garland Chapman .^ a bandit with a 
considerable loca l reputation in East . While under sentence 
a t Atlanata for a federal offense, be escaped and was engaged 
with a companion in the robbery of a store in Connecticut when 
dlse«yered by a watchman. The l a t t e r was shot and k i l l e d . On 
evidence tha t Chapman had f ired the short , he was arrested but 
ra i sed the question of could the State of Connecticut hold him 
as against the p r i o r claim of the Federal Government for his 
imprisonment at Atlanta? President Coolidge cut the legal 
task by pardoning Chapman for the federal offence thereby 
c lea r ing the way for his prosecution for murder by the Connec-
t i c u t a u t h o r i t i e s . Chapman claimed that he could not be pairdoned 
without his consent. The court ruled as in the Perovich case 
t ha t the consent of the oonvict not being necessary, the 
Federal Government could lawfully, upon no t ice of his pardon 
re l inquish him to the custody of the Connecticut a u t h o r i t i e s . 
This was done, and upon t r i a l he was convicted and executed. 
Can the President pardon for contempt of Court? The 
Supreme Court in Ebc Parte Phi l ip Grossman decided in the 
a f f i rmat ive . In th i s case Grossman sold l iquor in v io la t ion of 
10. 69 L. ed. 527. 
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National Prohibit ion Act, A federal d i s t r i c t Judge issued an 
order enjoining Grossman from se l l ing any more l iquor . Two 
days l a t e r Grossman viola ted the order and v»as thereupon found 
gu i l ty of contempt of cour t . He was sentenced to one year 
imprisonment and fined one thousand d o l l a r s . The President 
pardoned Grossman on the condition tha t the f ine be pa id . But 
the D i s t r i c t Judge refused to recognise the pardon. He conten-
ded Ifaat the P re s iden t ' s pardoning power extends only to offences 
aga ins t the United S t a t e s , Since Grossman was being punished 
for a v io la t ion of a Judge 's r e s t r a i n i n g order ra ther than for 
a v io l a t i on of the National Prohibit ion Act, only the offence 
aga ins t the judic iary was involved. In short a contempt of 
cour t does not f a l l in the category of offenses against the 
United S t a t e s , 
The Supreme Court af ter a thorough review of the 
P r e s i d e n t ' s power precedents, found tha t there was no l imi t 
to the pardoning power of the President except in cases of 
impeachment. 
There i s no conf l ic t between the jud ic ia l power to pass 
a sentence and the executive power to pardon i t . Because the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of a court to try an accused i s nothing more than 
i t s obligation to decide a matter formally placed before i t 
fo r the determination. 
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11 
In U.S. V. George Vllson, Marshall, J., stated as 
follows: "It is a constituent part of the judicial system 
that the judge sees only with judicial eyes and knows nothing 
respecting any particular case of which he is not informed 
judicially". 
12 In Ex Parte Grossman the court said tha t administration 
of j u s t i c e by the courts i s not necessar i ly or always wise or 
considera te of circumstances which may mitigate a g u i l t and 
i t order to remedy t h i s . I t was thought necessary to vest th i s 
in some other au thor i ty than 1he court to ameliorate or avoid 
p a r t i c u l a r criminal judgments. The exercise of th i s power has 
the effect of destroying the deterrent effect of j ud ic i a l 
punishment. The extent of the two powers, jud ic ia l and executive 
and the difference between the two has been pointed out . 
The c lass ic statement of that d i s t i nc t ion i s tha t of 
13 Sutherland, J . , U.S, v, Benz. Benz was sentenced by a court 
to one y e a r ' s imprisonment. While he was serving his sentence, 
he applied to the court to reduce his sentence which the court 
did by reducing i t to one of s ix months imprisonment. U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the power and Sutherland J , repelled the 
contention tha t i t const i tuted an invasion of the executive 
11 . 8 L. ed. 64-0 a t 643. 
12. 69 L. ed. 527 a t 530, 532-535. 
13. 75 L. ed. 354. 
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power of pardon by sayingo 
The j u d i c i a l power and the executive power over sentences 
a re readi ly d i s t ingu i shab le . To render judgment i s a j ud i c i a l 
funct ion. To carry the judgment into effect i s an executive 
funct ion. To cut short a sentence by an act of clemency i s an 
exercise of executive power which abridges the enforcement of 
the judgment, but does not a l t e r i t qua judgment. To reduce a 
sentence by amendment a l t e r s the terms of the judgment i t s e l f 
and i s a j ud ic i a l act as much as the imposition of the sentence 
in tiie f i r s t ins tance . 
Hence to conclude, i t i s c lea r that in U.S. the a t t i t ude 
of the courts with regaird to pardoning power of the President 
i s s imi lar with that of king 's prerogat ives of mercy in England. 
The courts in America have recognised th i s power to pardon as 
executive, d i s t inguish ing i t from judic ia l power. Because 
j u d i c i a l power i s exercisable on jud ic ia l considerations 
the courts would approach every question in regard to suspension 
with j ud i c i a l eye. They are unable to look to anything which 
i s outside the record or the f ac t s which are proved before 
them. As i t i s not the i r sphere to take into consideration 
anything which i s not s t r i c t l y j u d i c i a l . I t i s proved beyond 
doubt through the cour ts that there i s no confl ict between to 
pass a sentence jud ic i a l ly and to pardon i t execut ively. 
82 
INDIAN JUDICIAL ATTITUDE 
Indian judiciary i s a lso l ike tha t of United Sta tes and 
England adopting the nev/ pr inc ip les in order to give the r ea l 
meaning to the wording of cons t i tu t iona l provis ions . I t i s the 
duty of the judiciary to i n t e rp re t the cons t i tu t iona l provisions 
in auch a way that the . in tent ion and object of const i tu t ion 
makes be f u l f i l l e d . So to get the r ea l and crys ta l ized meaning 
of the provision even i t changes i t s e a r l i e r a t t i tude and dec i -
sions to the f u l l e s t possible l imit and periphery. 
Indian judiciary has t r ied i t s best to achieve object 
and give f u l l meaning to the cons t i tu t iona l provisions within 
the provisions of cons t i tu t ion for t h a t i t has imported some 
pr inc ip les from the U.S. and England a l so . 
As with regard to the law of pardon contained in 
Ar t ic le 72 and 161 of the cons t i tu t ion giving powers to the 
President and Govemors of the State respec t ive ly , the Supreme 
Court did not remained s t a t i c in i t s a t t i t u d e , I-t changed 
i t s a t t i t u d e with the times and changing circumstances. And 
l i k e tha t of U.S. Supreme Court i t has adopted the a t t i t u d e 
of d is t inguishing the jud ic i a l and executive powers with 
regard to punish and pardon and held in various cases that 
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judicial and executive conaiderations are different to decide 
the matter placed before it, 
14 Nanavati's case wasthe first case where the Supreme 
Court got the opportunity to express its opinion on the pardon-
ing power of the executive. In this case the Governor of 
Bombay had suspended the sentence passed on Nanavati till the 
disposal of his appeal to the Supreme Court on the condition 
that he will remain in naval custody in which he had been 
kept upon that time. On appeal to Supreme Court it was held 
that the order of Governor was constitutionally invalid from 
the Supreme Court was seized of the matter, since it conflict 
with the power of the court under Article 142 of the constitution. 
The Supreme Court applied the rule of harmonious cons-
truction. Sinha, C.J,, who delivered the opinion of the court 
held that Articles 161 and 142 contain no words of limitation 
and the field covered by them are also unfettered. If there 
is any field common to both, the principle of harmonious 
construction will have to be adopted in order to avoid the 
conflict between the two powers* On the principle of harmonious 
construction and to avoid between the two powers it must be held 
that Article 161 does not deal with the suspension of sentence 
during the time Article 142 is in operation and the matter is 
subjudice. 
14. K.M, Nanavati v. State of Bombay. AIR 1961, SC 113,114. 
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However, Kapur, J . , dissent ing opinion i s mucb convincing 
holding tha t the power to suspend a sentence was a part of the 
pardoning power which could be exercised at any time and which 
did not conf l ic t with the power of the court because the 
executive and Jud ic i a l control over sentences i s governed by 
d i s t i n c t and d i f fe ren t cons idera t ions . 
He fu r the r observed tha t the history of pardons, reprieve 
e t c . shows tha t the power of the executive in tha t sphere i s of 
the widest amplitude, plenary in nature and can be exercised 
a t any time a f t e r , the offence before or during t r i a l , a f te r 
judgment and before during and a f t e r disposal of the sppeal. 
So to say t h a t the power of the executive to suspend 
the sentence under Art icle 161 and of the judic iary under 
Ar t i c l e 142 or in confl ict i s to ignore the nature of the two 
powers and the d i f fe ren t considerat ions for t h e i r exerc ise . 
However, the ephemeral a t t i t u d e of the Supreme Court 
as the majority judgment of the Nanavati 's case for tunately 
could not remain as law for long. And the inde l ib le opinion 
forming the minority judgment of Kapur, J . , was accepted and 
confirmed in the same year and almost by the same bench in the 
15 Sarat Chandra's case . In t h i s case the Supreme Court came on 
i t s normal route and recognised the fact h i s t o r i c a l l y established 
15. (1961) 2 S.C.R. 133. 
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which was also the opinion of Kapur, J . , in Nanavati ' s case 
that the legal effect of the j u d i c i a l reduction of a sentence 
and an executive remission of tha t sentence was en t i r e ly 
d i f f e r e n t . 
Wanchoo, J . , while de l iver ing the judgment of the court 
held that an order of remission thus does not in any way 
i n t e r f e r e with 1he order of the cour t ; i t affect only the 
execution of the sentence passed by the court and frees the 
convicted person from his l i a b i l i t y . The power to grant 
remission i s executive power and can not have the effect of 
which the order of an appel la te or rev i s iona l court would 
have of reducing the sentence passed by the t r i a l court and 
s u b s t i t u t i n g in i t s place the reduced sentence adjudged by 
appe l l a te or r ev i s iona l court . 
16 Supreme Court r e l i ed upon the U.S» v. Benz and observed 
tha t the j ud i c i a l power and executive powers over sentences are 
r ead i ly d is t inguishable as observed J . Sutherland. "To render 
a judgment i s a j u d i c i a l function, to carry the judgment into 
e f fec t i s an executive function. To cut short a sentence by 
or ac t of clemency i s an exercise of executive power which 
abridges the enforcement of the judgment but does not a l t e r i t 
qua, judgment". 
16. ^upra n . 13 at p . 80 
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Hence the Supreme Court a t t i t u d e in Nanavati 'a case 
changed in t h i s case and pr inciple tha t there i s no confl ic t 
betvfeen jud ic ia l and executive powers over sentences as they 
are readi ly d i s t ingu i shab le . 
In Kul.leet Singh's case, the President re jected the mercy 
p e t i t i o n s of Ranga and Bi l l a . Ranga, thereupon f i l ed a writ 
p e t i t i o n in the Supreme Court. I t was argued tha t power con-
fe r red by Ar t ic le 72 on the President to grant pardon and commute 
sentences was a power coupled with a duty which must be f a i r ly 
and reasonably exercised. The Supreme Court observed that court 
did not know whether Go-vemment of India had formulated any 
uniform standard or guidelines under which Art ic le 72 was guided 
or intended to be guided. 
However, in t h i s case, the d i c t a in Ex Parte Phi l ip 
Grossmaa was approved and adopted. Where C.J . , Taft explained: 
'Executive clemency ex i s t s to afford r e l i e f from undue harshness 
or evident mistake in the operation or the enforcement of the 
criminal law. The administration of jus t i ce i s not necessar i ly 
always wise or ce r t a in ly considerate of circumstances which may 
proper ly mitigate g u i l t . To afford a remedy i t has always been 
thought e s s e n t i a l in popular governments, as. well as in monar-
chies to vest in some other author i ty tha t the courts power to 
16a. 1924, 267 U.S. 87: 69 Law ed. 527. 
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ameliorate or avoid pa r t i cu l a r criminal judgments . . . . " . 
Cbandrachud, C.J . , fu r ther obaeirved that the P re s iden t ' s 
power may have to await examination on an 'appropriate occasion *» 
He fur ther observed tha t present pe t i t ion did not provide such 
occasion, because whatever be the guidelines observed for the 
exercise of such power conferred by Art ic le 72, the only 
sentence which could possibly be imposed on Ranga was that of 
death and so no circumstances existed for in ter ference with such 
sentence. I t i s indeed encouraging that the 'appropriate 
occasion' did eventually came and the court was not overawed 
by the victim of crimeo 
However, the reference to the judgment of Chief Jus t ice 
Taft in Ex Parte Grossman shows tha t the court real ized tha t 
famil iar argument about uniform standards or guidelines was 
inapplicable to the power of pardon. Rightly Cbandrachud, C.J . , 
a f t e r c i t i n g the Grossman case observed tha t the necessity or 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of exercising the pardoning power had to be judged 
from case to ca se . After a l l the power was used for reducing 
and not enhancing the sentence. 
In t h i s case the Supreme Court recognised the observation 
of Grossman case, tha t administrat ion of j u s t i c e by courts i s 
not always necessar i ly wise or ce r ta in ly considerate of 
circumstances which may properly mitigate g u i l t and th i s 
pardoning power i s a check entrusted to the -Bxecutive for specia l 
cases to exercise i t to the extent of destroying the deterrent 
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effect of j u d i c i a l punishment. 
17 In Maru Ram'a case , i t was contended tha t by the 
introduction of Section 433A, Section 432 i s excluded for 
c e r t a i n c lasses of l i f e r s and Section 433(a) suffers e c l i p s e . 
Since Section 432 and 433(a) are s ta tu tory expressions and 
modus operandi of the cons t i tu t iona l power Section 433A would 
be ine f fec t ive . But Supreme Court re;)ected the contention 
and held although power under Art ic le 72 and 161 which i s 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and that under Section 432 and 433(a), which 
i s s t a t u t o r y , may be s imi la r but they are not the same or 
i d e n t i c a l . The two powers d i f fe r in their source, substance 
and s t reng th . I t was further held that c o n s t i t u t i o n a l power 
i s untouchable and unapproachable and can not suffer the 
v i c i s s i t udes of simple l e g i s l a t i v e process. Therefore, 
Section 433A can not be inval idated as ind i r ec t ly v io la t ive 
of Ar t ic le 72 and 161. 
In th i s case the Supreme Court held that in exercising 
the power under Art icle 72 and 161, President and Governor act 
and must act not on the i r own judgment but in accordance with 
the aid and advice of t h e i r council of min i s t e r s . Court further 
adviced a l l public power including cons t i tu t iona l power sha l l 
never be exercisable a rb i t r a ry or malafide and o rd ina r i ly , 
gu ide l ines for f a i r and equal execution are guarantors of the 
17. Maru Ram v. Union of India, 1981 S.C.C. 107. 
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v a l i d p lay of power. 
18 In Sher Singh c a s e , the p e t i t i o n e r contended t h a t 
de lay in execution of sen tence of death exceeding two yea r s 
e n t i t l e s the person under sentence of death t o demand quashing 
the sen tence and c o n v e r t i n g i t in to sentence of l i f e impr i son-
18a 
mento He based h i s con t en t i on on the d e c i s i o n in Vatheeswaran 
case where i t was held t h a t delay exceeding two yea r s in the 
execu t ion of death sen tence should be considered s u f f i c i e n t to 
e n t i t l e t he person under sentence of death to invoke A r t i c l e 21 
and demand the quashing of the s e n t e n c e . 
Chandracbud, G . J . , he ld t h a t de lay exceeding two years 
in the execut ion of death sentence i t s e l f does not e n t i t l e 
t h e person under the sentence to demand conver t ing i t i n t o 
s e n t e n c e of l i f e imprisonment. Chandracbud, C . J . , i n s t r u c t e d 
the Government of Ind ia and S t a t e Governments t h a t p e t i t i o n s 
f i l e d under A r t i c l e 72 and 161 of the c o n s t i t u t i o n o r under 
S s . 432-33 of Cr .P .C . must be disposed of e x p e d i t i o u s l y . A 
s e l f imposed r u l e should be followed by the execu t ive a u t h o r i t y 
r i g o r o u s l y t h a t every such p e t i t i o n s h a l l be d i sposed of within 
a pe r i od of t h r e e months, from the d a t e on which i t i s r ece ived . 
He observed t h a t long and in t e rminab le de lays in the d i sposa l of 
t h e s e p e t i t i o n s are a s e r ious hurd le in d i spensa t i on of j u s t i c e . 
18. A . I .R . 1983 S.C. 465. 
18a. A . I .R . 1983 S.C. 2 6 1 . 
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In t h i s case i t was held t h a t there i s no hard and 
f a s t ru le as i t was la id down in Yatbeeswaran case . But i t can 
be a unquestionably important consideration for determining 
whether death sentence be converted into a l i f e sentence. 
Hence Vatheeswaran case was overruled in this dec i s ion . 
19 Ear l ie r in Kul.jeet Singh's case , the Supreme Court 
observed that scope of Pres ident ' s power as regards t h i s 
Ar t i c l e 72 may have to await examination on an 'appropriate 
occas ion ' . 
20 In Kehar Singh's case , the Supreme Court has now 
seized the occasion by making i t c l ea r tha t the President has 
complete d iscre t ion in exercise of t h i s power. I t was expressed 
tha t having regard to the seriousness of the controversy we 
have considered i t appropriate to pronounce the opinion of th is 
cour t on the ques t ions . The Supreme Court in th i s case observed 
tha t power to pardon is a par t of cons t i tu t iona l scheme and i t 
should be so t reated in the Indian Republic. I t has been 
reposed by the people through the cons t i tu t ion in the head of 
the s t a t e and envoys high s t a t u s . The power to pardon res t s 
on the advice tendered by the Executive to the Pres ident , who 
subject to the provisions of Ar t ic le 72(1) must act in accor-
dance with such advice* 
19. Supra n . 34 at p . 54. 
20. Kehar Singh v . Union of India. AIR 1989 SC 653. 
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I t was observed that i t i s open to the President in the 
exercise of the power vested in him by Ar t ic le 72 of the cons-
t i t u t i o n to sc ru t in i se the evidence on the record of the 
criminal case and come to a d i f ferent conclusion from tha t 
recorded by the court , in regard to 1fce gu i l t of, and sentence 
imposed on the accused. In doing so the President does not 
amend or modify or supersede the ^judicial record. The jud i c i a l 
record remain in tac t and undisturbed. The President ac ts in a 
wholly d i f fe ren t plane from tha t in which the court ac ted . He 
ac ts under a cons t i tu t iona l power, the nature of which is 
en t i r e ly d i f fe ren t from the j ud i c i a l power and can not be 
regarded as an extension of i t . Court in th is case ci ted the 
21 
observation of Sutherland in U.S. v . Benzen tha t "the jud ic i a l 
power and executive power over sentences are readi ly d i s t i n -
guishable . . . , " 
As with regaird to the jud ic i a l review i t was observed 
tha t order of the President can not be subjected to jud ic i a l 
review on i t s meri ts except within certain l i m i t a t i o n s . However, 
the function of determining whether the act of cons t i tu t iona l or 
s t a tu to ry functionary f a l l s within the cons t i tu t iona l or l e g i s -
l a t i v e conferment of power, or i s v i t i a ted by self denial on an 
erroneous appreciat ion of the f a i l amplitude of the scope of 
the power i s a matter for the cour t . 
2 1 . Supra n . 13 at p . 80. 
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The courte are the cons t i t u t i ona l ins t rumenta l i t i es to go 
i n t o the scope of Art icle 72 but can not analyse the exercise 
of power under Ar t ic le 72 on i t s merito The question as to -toe 
a rea of the P re s iden t ' s power under Art icle 72 f a l l s squarely 
within the Jud ic ia l domain and can be examined by the court by 
way of j ud i c i a l review. 
I t was also urged that in order to prevent an a rb i t ra ry 
exerc ise of power under Art ic le 72 t h i s court should draw up a 
se t of guidelines for regulat ing the exercise of th i s power. 
But the court observed that there i s suf f ic ient indicat ion in 
terms of Article 72 and in the h is tory of the power enshrined 
in that provision as well as ex i s t ing case law, and speci f ic 
gu ide l ines need not be spelled out . I t was expressed by the 
cour t that i t may not be possible to lay down any p rec i se , 
c l e a r l y defined and suff ic ient ly channelized guide l ines , for we 
must remember t h a t the power under Ar t i c l e 72 i s of the widest 
amplitude can contemplate a myriad kinds and catagor ies of 
cases with facts and s i tua t ions varying from case to case in 
which the merits and reasons of s t a t e may be profoundly assisted 
by p reva i l ing occasion and passing t ime. And i t i s of great 
s i gn i f i can t that function i t s e l f enjoys high s ta tus in the 
cons t i t u t i ona l scheme. 
But the Judgment i s not without some disappointing features . 
As to those who consider capi ta l punishment as i n t r i n s i c a l l y evi l 
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the judgment must be a p p a l i n g . The c o u r t dec l ined t o reverse 
i t s p r e v i o u s r u l i n g upholding the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of c a p i t a l 
punishment on the ground t h a t under the p resen t c r i m i n a l law 
death sentence i s an except ion to "be meted out in the r a r e s t of 
r a r e case and the s t a t i s t i c s showed t h a t between 1974 to 1978 
22 
when 85*000 murders were committed only 29 persons were hanged. 
The a l t i t u d e of the court in t h i s remain the same r a t h e r 
i t has confiitned the judgment of Kul.ieet S ingh ' s c a s e . The 
v i t a l po in t in t h i s judgment i s tha t i t has not ru l ed out 
j u d i c i a l review even though the power under A r t i c l e 72 i s of 
w i d e s t ampli tude and can contemplate a myriad k inds and c a t a -
g o r i e s of c a s e s . 
In the words of S o l i J . Sorabjee one may r i g h t l y regard 
t h i s judgment as the high water mark of j u d i c i a l rev iew, a bas ic 
f e a t u r e of our c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
I t i s no t c l e a r whether t h e cour t has ru led out the giving 
of reasons by the P r e s i d e n t in a l l cases or only in Kehar Singh 's 
case because of i t s observa t ion t h a t t h e r e i s no ques t ion in t h i s 
ca se of asking fo r the reasons f o r the P r e s i d e n t ' s o r d e r . To 
suppor t a dec i s ion by s t a t e d reasons in considered the hallmark 
of good and f a i r government, our Supreme Court has gone f u r t h e r 
and cons ide r s i t a requirement on n a t u r a l j u s t i c e . 
2 2 . The Times of I n d i a , January 2 , 1989 
2 3 . I b i d . 
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The Supreme Court of India by i t s judgment in t h i s case 
has v ind ica t ed i t s r e p u t a t i o n as the s e n t i n a l on the qu i vive 
f o r anyone seek ing i t s p r o t e c t i o n . However, in c r i t i c i s m i t 
can be sa id t h a t cour t did no t i n s t r u c t e d to the Executive any 
s p e c i f i c g u i d e l i n e s for the e x e r c i s e of the power under Ar t . 72 . 
If the P re s iden t i s no t aware of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t 
how f a i r l y he can exe rc i s e h i s power i s d o u b t f u l . As on 15th 
November, 198S, the Secre ta ry to the P r e s i d e n t wrote to Counsel 
of Kehar Singh as f o l l o w s : 
"Reference i s i nv i t ed t o your l e t t e r dated Nov. 3 , 1988, 
on the sub jec t mentioned above. The l e t t e r has been persued by 
the P r e s i d e n t and i t s con t en t s c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d . The 
P r e s i d e n t i s of t he opinion t h a t he can not go i n t o the m e r i t s 
24 
of a case f i n a l l y decided by the Highest Court of the l a n d " . 
Vfhereas the Supreme Court i s of the opinion t h a t the 
P r e s i d e n t i s e n t i t l e d to go in to 1he mer i t s of the case no twi th -
s t and ing t h a t i t has been j u d i c i a l l y concluded by the c o n s i d e r a -
25 t ion given to i t by t h i s c o u r t . 
So e i t h e r the P r e s i d e n t must have sought the advice from 
the Supreme Court before r e j e c t i n g the mercy p e t i t i o n of Kehar 
Singh or whi le e x e r c i s i n g the power of j u d i c i a l review the cour t 
must have advised the P r e s i d e n t t h a t he should r e c o n s i d e r the 
mercy p e t i t i o n while knowing t h a t he has the r i g h t to go i n t o 
the mer i t s of the case . 
24 . A . I .R . 1989 p . 656. 
2 5 . A . I .R . 1989 S.C. p . 659. 
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COMPARISION OF ATTITUDE 
Before comparing the a t t i t u d e of courts in India and 
U.S. one thing should be kept in mind that the const i tu t ion 
of United States i s centuries older than that of India . 
Therefore, i t i s obvious that more pr inc ip les and a t t i t ude 
might be adopted by the lijdian c o u r t s . As both the cons t i tu -
t i o n s provided for the provision of pardon which i s to be 
exercised through the executive head of s t a t e . But ne i ther 
the word pardon nor the manner in which i t i s to be exercised 
have been defined in any cons t i t u t i on . So i t remained the 
function of judic iary how to i n t e r p r e t i t to get the desired 
r e s u l t for which 1he provision regarding the pardoning power 
i s contained in the cons t i tu t ion . While going through the cases 
decided by the apex courts of both the countr ies , India and U,s. 
and a f t e r comparing we wi l l find much s imi la r i ty than clash. 
There may be differences regarding some aspects but in general 
cour ts in both the countr ies interpreted the provisions regard-
ing pardoning power almost on the same foo t ing . 
U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Wilson defined the 
pardon as an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted 
with the execution of the laws, which exempts an individual on 
whom i t i s bestowed from the punishment the law i n f l i c t s for 
a crime he has camnitted. I t i s the p r i v a t e , though o f f i c i a l , 
96 
ac t of the executive magis t ra te , delivered to the individual 
fo r whose benef i t i t i s intended and not communicated o f f i c i a l l y 
to the cour t . But the same court af ter a long period changed 
i t s a t t i t u d e and in Perovich case i t was said that pardon i s 
not a pr iva te act of grace from an individual happening to 
possess power. I t i s a par t of the cons t i tu t iona l scheme* 
When granted i t i s the determination of ul t imate authori ty that 
the public welfare wi l l be b e t t e r served by i n f l i c t i n g what the 
judgment f ixed. 
In India the court if not d i rec t ly said t h i s power as a 
27 
cons t i t u t iona l scheme even than in Re-Channugadu case Madras 
High Court recognised t h i s while in another manner. I t said 
tha t our country i s now a sovereign republic and in many aspects 
the power of pardon and reprieve conferred on the President and 
Governors i s very s imilar to the power of President of U.S. in 
grant ing pardon and repr ieve . The wording of the corresponding 
a r t i c l e s i s also s imi lar and such being the case decisions of 
the U.S. Supreme Court are useful in the decision of th i s poin t . 
A comparision of the language of these Art ic les 72 and 
161 with Section 2 of Ar t i c le I I of U.S. cons t i tu t ion wi l l show 
the s i m i l a r i t y between them. I t , therefore , can be gathered 
tha t President of U.S. can grant a pardon before conviction i t 
26. Supra n . 9 at p . 77. 
27. Supra n . 22 a t p . 43 
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stand to reaaon that appropriate autbority in India exercising 
power under similar provisions must have that power. 
no 
In Benz case , U.S. Supreme Court while upholding the 
v a l i d i t y of reduction of sentence by court from one year to 
s ix months, supreme court made a c l ea r d i s t inc t ion between 
executive and jud ic i a l power and observed that j ud i c i a l and 
executive powers are read i ly d i s t ingu i shab le . To render judgment 
i s a j ud i c i a l function to carry the judgment into effect i s an 
executive function . . . . To reduce a sentence by amendment a l t e r s 
the tarms of the judgment i t s e l f is a j ud i c i a l a:t as much as 
the Imposition of the sentence in the f i r s t ins tance. 
Similar views were expressed by the courts in India as 
if pardon i s given a f te r sentence, there i s no confl ic t e i t h e r , 
for to pass a sentence i s a jud ic ia l function, governed by 
j u d i c i a l considerat ions, to pardon a sentence is an executive 
function governed by consideration r a the r than jud ic i a l as 
mercy or pol icy . 
29 Madras High Court in re-Chennugadu case c i ted the 
above mentioned passage with approval and observed tha t the 
r e l ease of the pr isoners condemned to death in exercise of 
powers conferred under Section 4-01 Cr.P.C. and Article 161 of 
the cons t i tu t ion does not amount to i n t e r f e r e with tie due and 
28. Supra n . 13 a t p . 80. 
29. Supra n . 22 at p . 4.3. 
98 
and proper course of j u s t i c e as the power of t h i s court to 
pronounce upon the v a l i d i t y propriety and correctness of the 
conviction and sentence remained uneffected. 
30 But in Nanavati case the a t t i t u d e of Supreme Court 
of ]J3dia was otherwise as the Supreme Court could not make such 
a d i s t i nc t i on and observed that there i s conf l ic t between the 
executive and jud ic ia l power over a sentence because both the 
a r t i c l e s 161 and 142 contain no words of l imi ta t ion and the 
f i e ld covered by them i s a l so unfet tered. So in order to avoid 
the conf l i c t court adopted the pr inciple of harmonious construc-
t i o n . 
However, Kapur, J . in his minority judgment approved the 
d i s t inc t ion between executive and jud ic i a l power over a sentence 
and held tha t there i s no conf l ic t between both these powers. 
He fur ther observed tha t h is tory of pardons reprieve e t c . shows 
tha t the power of the executive in tha t sphere i s of the widest 
amplitude, plenary in nature and can be exercised at any time 
a f t e r the offence - before or during t r i a l , a f t e r judgment and 
before during and a f t e r disposal of the appeal . 
31 In Sarat Chandra Rabha case , the Supreme Court in the 
same year affirmed the minority judgment of Nanavati case 
meaning thereby that the d i s t inc t ion made in Benz case was 
30. Supra n , 28 at p . 4 7 . 
31 . Supra n . 15 at p . 84, 
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approved by the Indian apex court and was observed that now 
it ia not disputed that in England and India the effect of 
pardon or what is sometimes called a free pardon as to clear 
a person from all infamy and from all consequences of the 
offence for which it is granted and from all statutory or other 
disqualification. But the same effect does not follow on a 
mere remission which stands on a different footing. As an order 
of remission thus does not in any way interfere with the order 
of the court, it affects only the execution of the sentence 
passed by the court and frees the convicted person from his 
liability to undergo the full term of imprisonment inflicted 
by the court, though the order of conviction and sentence 
passed by the court still stands as it was. The power to grant 
remission in executive power and can not have the effect of 
which the order of an appellate or revisional court would have 
of reducing the sentence passed by the trial court and substi-
tuting in its place the reduced sentence ad;)udged by the 
appellate or revisional court. 
The court in this case cited the classical statement 
made by Sutherland, J., in Benz's case^ decided by U.S. Supreme 
Court distinguishing executive and judicial power over sentence. 
The question as what ig the attitude of U.S. and Indian 
courts regarding the affect of pardon. In Ex P. Garland case 
32. Supra n. 13 at p. 80. 
33. 4, Wallace 333 (1867). 
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i t was observed by the U.S. Supreme Court tha t the inquiry 
a r i s e s as to the effect and operation of a pardon and on t h i s 
point a l l au tho r i t i e s concur. A pardon reaches both the punish-
ment prescribed for the offence and the g u i l t of the offender 
and when the pardon i s f u l l i t releases the punishment and b lo t 
out of existence the g u i l t so that in the eye of law the 
offender i s as innocent as if he had never committed the offence, 
and if granted a f te r convict ion, i t removes the penal t ies and 
d i s a b i l i t i e s and res to res him to a l l h is c i v i l r i g h t s . 
34 Supreme Court of India in Habba case deciding tha t 
High Court was r ight in holding that appel lant was d i s q u a l i -
f ied under Section 7(b) of representat ion of People Act and 
his nomination paper had been r ight ly re jec ted , approved the 
above U.S. rul ing tha t f u l l pardon reaches the punishment 
b lo t out the existence of gu i l t and the offender becomes as 
innocent as if be had never committed the offence and t h i s 
pardon r e s to re s him a l l the c iv i l r i g h t s . 
35 In Grossman case another exposition of law was found 
by U.S. Supreme Court where i t was said tha t executive clemency 
e x i s t s to afford r e l i e f from undue harshness or evident mistake 
in the operation or the enforcement of the criminal law. I t 
was said tha t administration of j u s t i c e i s not always wise or 
cerljainly considerate of circumstances which may properly 
34. Supra n . 15 a t p .84 . 
35. 69 L. ed. 527 a t 530,532,535. 
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mit igate g u i l t . To afford a remedy i t has always been thought 
e s s e n t i a l in popular governments as well as in monarchies, to 
vest in some other authori ty than the courts power to ameliorate 
or avoid p a r t i c u l a r criminal judgments. 
36 In Kul.jeet Singh case where i t was contended that 
President under Article 72 has wron&Ly rejected the mercy 
pe t i t ion of the p e t i t i o n e r . The Supreme Court while r e j ec t i ng 
the contention held that we see no j u s t i f i c a t i o n for saying 
tha t in refusing to commute the sentence of death imposed upon 
the p e t i t i o n e r into a l e s s e r sentence the President has in any 
manner t ransgressed his d iscre t ionary power under Art ic le 72. 
Undoubtedly, the President has the power in an appropriate 
case to commute any sentence imposed by a court into a l e s se r 
sentence. The court then quoted that "executive clemency 
ex i s t s to afford re l i e f from undue harshness or evident mistake 
in the operation or enforcement of criminal law" and said that 
whether Ifae case i s appropriate for existence of power conferred 
by Art ic le 72 depends upon the fac t s and circumstances of each 
pa r t i cu l a r case and necess i ty therefore i s to be judged from 
case to case . 
I t was further observed in th is case t h a t court did not 
know whether the government of India had formulated any uniform 
standard or guidelines under which Art ic le 72 was guided or 
36. Supra n . 34- at p . 54. 
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intended to be guide. Whatever be the guidel ines observed for 
the exercise of such power conferred by Ar t ic le 72, the only 
sentence which could possibly be imposed on Ranga was that of 
death and no circumstances existed for in terference with such 
sentence. In t h i s case i t i s indeed encouraging that the 
'appropr ia te occasion' did eventually come and the court was 
not overawed by the victim of crime. 
However, the reference to the judgment in Grossman shows 
that the court has realized that the fami l ia r argument about 
uniform standards or guidel ines was inapplicable to the power 
of pardon. 
In Garland case i t has been held tha t the power of 
pardon i s not subject to l e g i s l a t i v e control nor i s open to 
l e g i s l a t u r e to change the effect of pardon. The executive 
may grant pardon for good reason or bad or for any reason at 
a l l i t s act i s f i na l and i r revocable . The court have no power 
and concern with the reasons which actuated the executive. 
This power i s beyond the control of jud ic ia ry . This view was 
^7 
affirmed in U.S. v. Klein case.- ' 
38 In Ex Par te United States , Supreme Court on a writ of 
mandamus in which judges suspended indef in i te ly the sentence 
they had pronounced while jus t i fy ing t h e i r action the judges 
3 7 . (1871) 13 Wal 128, 147, 20 L. ed. 519, 526. 
3 8 . (191b) 242 U.S. 27, 46, 61 L. ed. 129. 
103 
referred to the character of the accused, the circumstances of 
the crime and to the i r conviction that if the sentence were 
suspended, the accused would be reclaimed as useful member of 
soc ie ty . The power to suspend the sentence was supported as 
an inherent j u d i c i a l power* 
Supreme Court negatived an inherent j ud i c i a l power, i t 
observed tha t i t was for l eg i s l a tu r e to fix and determine the 
punishment for crime, including circumstances which can be 
taken into account as a matter of jud ic i a l d i sc re t ion , i t was 
fo r judiciary to sward punishment according to law and i t was 
fo r executive to re l i eve from the punishment fixed by law. 
ID India the question whether jud ic ia l review extends 
to an examination of the order passed by the President under 
Ar t i c l e 72 of the const i tu t ion came before Supreme Court in a 
39 
recent case of Kehar Singh, the court observed tha t we are only 
confined to the area and scope of the Pres iden t ' s power and 
did not with the question whether the power had been trnly 
exercised on mer i t s . I t has been held that the question as 
to the area of the Pres iden t ' s power under Art ic le 72 f a l l s 
squarely within the jud ic ia l domain and can be examined by the 
cour t s by way of j u d i c i a l review. Court further observed 
although i t was ca tagor ica l ly s ta ted that the court was not 
going into the question as to whether the P re s iden t ' s power 
39. Supra n . 47 a t p . 69. 
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had been t ru ly exercised on the mer i t s , i t was observed that 
"vje think that the order of the President can not be subjected 
to jud ic i a l review on i t s merits except within the defined 
l i m i t a t i o n s " . 
Now the question i s as what are the s t r i c t l i m i t a t i o n s . 
Court referred the Maru Ram case and cited the function of 
determining whether the act of a cons t i tu t iona l or s ta tu tory 
functionary f a l l s within the cons t i tu t iona l or l e g i s l a t i v e 
conferment of power or is v i t i a t e d by self denied on an erroneous 
appreciat ion of f u l l amplitude of 1fae power is a matter for the 
c o u r t . 
41 In State of Ra.lasthan v . Union of India, Supreme Court 
held that so long as question a r i s e s whether an authori ty under 
the const i tu t ion has acted within the l imi t s of i t s power or 
exceeded i t , i t can cer ta inly be decided by the court . Indeed 
i t w i l l be i t s cons t i tu t iona l obligation to do so . . . . This 
cour t i s the ul t imate i n t e rp re t e r of the cons t i tu t ion and to 
t h i s court i s assigned the de l i ca te task of determining what 
i s the power conferred on each branch of government. Whether 
l imited or not if limited whether i t has transgressed i t s 
l i m i t s . I t is for the court to uphold the cons t i tu t iona l 
l i m i t a t i o n s . That i s the essence of Rule of Law. 
40, In t h i s case i t was held tha t if the consideration or occa-
sion for the exercise of President power be wholly i r i ^ l e v a n t , 
i r r a t i o n a l , discreminatory or malafide the court wi l l examine 
the exercise of power in those rare cases . 
4 1 . (1978) 1 SCR p . 8 0 - 8 1 . 
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42 Again in Minerva Mills Ltd. v . Union of India , 
Bhagwati, J . , said : "The question ar i ses as to which author i ty 
must decide what are the l imi t s on the power conferred upon 
each organ or instrumental i ty of the s t a te and whether such 
l i m i t s are transgressed or not . .« The cons t i tu t ion has, 
therefore , created an independent machinery for resolving these 
disputes and t h i s independent machinery i s the judic iary which 
i s vested with the power of j u d i c i a l review". 
42. (1981) 1 S.C.R. 206 p . 286-87. 
C-rH A P T £ R - IV 
C O N C L U S I O N 
C O N G L U S I O N 
The power to pardon had been exercised from the time 
immemorial by a executive head of the s t a t e . As i t i s well 
es tabl ished that the administration of j u s t i c e through courts 
i s a par t of the cons t i tu t iona l schemco Under t h i s scheme 
i t i s f o r the judge to pronounce judgment and impose sentence 
and i t i s for the executive to enforce them. Generally such 
enforcement presents no d i f f i c u l t i e s , but circumstances may 
a r i s e where carrying out the sentence or se t t ing the machinery 
of j u s t i c e in motion might imperil the safety of the realm. 
Thus, if MiQ enforcement of such sentence is l ike ly to lead 
blood-shed and revolution the executive might well pause before 
exposing the stake of such p e r i l . 
1 
I t i s also observed in some cases that the f a l l i b i l i t y 
of human judgment being undeniable even in the most trained 
mind a mind resourced by a harvest of experience, i t has been 
considered appropriate t h a t in the matter of l i f e and personal 
l i b e r t y the protection should be extended by ent rus t ing power 
to some higher author i ty to scru t in ise the va l id i ty of the 
threatened denial of l i f e or continued denial of personal 
l i b e r t y . Such power under the parliamen tary democracy i s 
1. Ex Parte Grossman, 69 L.ed. 527; Kehar Sing:h v. Union of 
of India. AIR 19S9 SG 653. 
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reposed in the highest authori ty of the s t a t e . 
Our const i tu t ion l ike many others of the world does 
provide the p res iden t ia l power of pardoning. As these provi -
sions contained in the const i tu t ion empowers the President and 
Governor of s ta te under Art ic les 72 and 161 respec t ive ly . 
Here we are concerned with the power of the President under 
Ar t i c le 72 of the Const i tu t ion . 
While using thig power executive is not necessar i ly 
guided by the rules of evidence and a decision in one case may 
not be a precedent for subsequent cases . As many time new 
fac t s come to l igh t a f t e r the process of adjudication through 
law courts exhausted in such event the power to grant . In 
such event the power to grant pardon or reduce the sentence 
would be read i ly j u s t i f i e d . 
Now and again do cases occur in which the Supreme Court 
i s cal led upon to look into the power of the President of India 
to grant pardon. But in sp i t e of the fact that there are few 
cases regarding th i s power the Supreme Court in each case e i ther 
adopted or developed new p r inc ip l e s . At the same time i t i s 
observed by the Supreme Court that the power is of widest ampli-
tude so i t i s d i f f i cu l t to keep the President bound within 
specif ic l i m i t s . 
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2 
Though Nan a v a t i ' s case i s not d i r ec t ly re la ted to 
Ar t i c l e 72 of the const i tu t ion even than i t has i t s own values 
and importance of i t s being f i r s t case where the Supreme Court 
has expressed i t s opinion upon the cons t i tu t iona l importance 
of the pardoning power of the executive. Therefore, i t is 
indispensable for concluding the present posi t ion of the 
Ar t ic le 72. In t h i s case Supreme Court slurred over the long 
es tabl ished d i s t inc t ion of executive and jud ic ia l power over 
the sentences and held t h a t Governor's power to suspend a 
sentence could not be exercised from the time the Supreme 
Court has seized of the matter t i l l the matter disposed of. 
Kapur, J . , delivered a very convincing dissent judgment 
holding tha t the power to suspend sentence was a par t of the 
pardoning power which could be exercised at any time and which 
did not confl ic t with the power of the cour t . The d i s t inc t ion 
maintained by Kapur, J . between executive and jud ic ia l power 
3 
was affirmed in Rabha case . 
As with regard to nature and scope of Art icle 72 of 
the const i tu t ion an important question was raised before 
4 Supreme Court in Ranga's case where on re jec t ing the mercy 
2 . Supra n. 28 at p . 4 7 . 
3 . Supra n . 32 at p . 5 2 . 
4 . Supra n . 34 at p . 5 4 . 
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pe t i t i on by the Pres ident . Ranga f i l ed a pet i t ion before the 
Supreme Court arguing tha t power conferred by Article 72 on 
the President to grant pardon and commute sentences was a power 
coupled with a duty which must be f a i r l y and reasonably exer-
c ised . But the Supreme Court observed that court did not know 
whether Government of India had formulated any uniform standard 
or guidelines under which Art ic le 72 was guided or in tended to 
be guided. And upon f ina l hearing the court fu r ther observed 
t h a t executive clemency ex is t s to afford r e l i e f from undue 
harshness on evident mistake in the operation or enforcement 
of criminal law and expressed tha t Pres ident ' s power may have 
to await examination on an "appropriate occasion". 
5 In Kehar Singh case the Supreme Court vvas cal led upon 
to examine in depth the power of pardon bestowed upon the 
Pres ident under Art ic le 72 of the cons t i tu t ion . 
The judgment c la r i f ied that the President had t o t a l 
d i sc re t ion while considering a pe t i t ion for pardon under 
Ar t i c l e 72. I t i s for him to decide how best he can acquaint 
himself with a l l the information tha t i s necessary for proper 
and effective d i sposa l . I t i s evident that the power under 
A r t i c l e 72 e n t i t l e s him to examine the record of evidence of 
a criminal case and to determine for himself whether the case 
i s one deserving the grant of the r e l i e f f a l l i ng within that 
5 . Supra n. 46 at p . 63 . 
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power. The court fur ther observed that we are of opinion that 
the President i s e n t i t l e to go into the merits of the case 
notwithstanding that i t has "been jud ic i a l ly concluded by the 
considerat ions given to i t by th i s cour t . 
Yet another point decided by the court was the scope of 
Judic ia l review of P res iden t ' s power of pardon. Ihe judges 
c l a r i f i ed a t the outset tha t we are confined to the question 
as to the area and scope of Pres iden t ' s power and not with the 
question whether i t has been truely exercised on the mer i t s . 
I t was fur ther accepted by the court in th is judgment 
that in England the power of pardon is royal prerogative and 
an act of grace issuing from the sovereign. On the contrary 
in 1he United States i t is not a private act of grace but a 
par t of the cons t i tu t iona l scheme. 
Adopting the U.S. view, the Bench asserted that the 
power to pardon i s a par t of the cons t i tu t iona l scheme and 
we have no doubt in our mind that i t should be so treated also 
in the Indian Republic. 
In th i s case the Supreme Court f e l t i t i s not necessary 
to lay down guidelines for regulat ing the exercise of P re s iden t ' s 
power of pardon to prevent a r b i t r a r i n e s s , observing that power 
being of widest amplitude. 
However, the important point decided in th i s judgment i s 
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that of j ud i c i a l review of the power of President under 
Art ic le 72 of the Const i tu t ion. The court observed that 
P re s iden t ' s order can not be subject to j u d i c i a l review on 
i t s merits except within cer ta in l imi ta t ions as expressed 
in Maru Bam case , if the P res iden t ' s power be wholly 
i r r e l e v a n t , i r r a t i o n a l discriminatory or raalafide. 
While keeping in view the above cases i t i s vivid to 
conclude that President being the cons t i tu t iona l head of the 
s t a t e i s vested with the power to pardon death sentence under 
Ar t i c le 72 of the Const i tut ion, This power i s exactly the 
d iscre t ionary power of the Pres ident . He can come to a 
d i f ferent conclusion from that recorded by the court in 
regard to the g u i l t of, and sentence imposed on the accused. 
He acts under a cons t i tu t iona l power the nature of which 
i s en t i r e ly d i f ferent from the jud ic i a l pov;er and can not be 
regarded as an extension of i t . 
However, the President i s not bound, to make public 
h i s reasons for decision. Secondly, the reasons for granting 
or not granting pardon may, despite the cons t i tu t ion , not be 
h i s own ; tha t i s he might be influenced t o t a l l y by the 
notinga on the f i l e s made by the Sec re ta r i a t e . That means 
the President may not r e a l l y be applying his mind. Again, 
6. A.I,R. 1980 SC 2147, 
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we have no ways of knowing what c r i t e r i a the advisers to 
the President follow in annotat ing clemency papers , and 
in th i s context how much a t ten t ion do they pay to the obser-
vations of the Supreme Court in the ins tant case . 
As there are no guidelines for exercising the power 
under t h i s A r t i c l e , the President and his advisers may follow 
any procedure in considering clemency p e t i t i o n s , the P res iden t ' s 
decision are non-speaking they can not be reviewed e i the r on 
any known pr inc ip les of administrat ive J u s t i c e ; so that there 
ex is t no merely unbridled discre t ion in a r r iv ing at the actual 
decisions but a lso unreviewabil i ty . Though the clemency powers 
are open to cons t i tu t iona l challenge yet unless some reason-
able procedure is prescribed for the exercise of the power to 
pardon the Judic ia l review can not be exercised properly. So 
if i t i s not possible to prescribe a specif ic guidelines for 
exercis ing t h i s power the procedure and general guidelines 
must be prescribed for exercising t h i s power under Art ic le 72. 
Because without any procedure, guidelines and even without 
assigning any reasons for grant ing or not grant ing pardon 
under Ar t ic le 72 the Judic ia l review becomes v i r t u a l l y impossible 
and would be reduced to a teasing i l l u s ion . 
The duty involved in the granting of a pardon or 
commutation of a sentence is a most de l ica te cons t i tu t iona l 
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respons ib i l i ty because i t l i e s within the d iscre t ionary power 
of the Pres iden t . One s ingle f ac to r in considering th i s power 
to pardon i s tha t i t should not be exercised against public 
i n t e r e s t . The question which the President must consider is 
whether under pecul ia r circumstances of hardship he can grant 
pardon without dis turbing the ef fec ts of punishment in de te r -
r i ng others from committing crimes. 
Ultimately an act of pardon involves a deep sense of 
r ightness or j u s t i c e which goes beyond the j u d i c i a l decision 
of the court which condemned the man. 
Therefore, the cumulative effect of Maru Ram and 
Kehar Singh i s tha t the Supreme Court has a power to review 
j u d i c i a l l y the disposal of pe t i t ion under Art ic le 72 if i t 
i s done with i r r e l e v a n t , extraneous and malafide considera-
t i o n s . Further, while concealing a large amount of discret ion 
to President of India which in effect means the Council of 
Minis ters headed by Prime Minister to exercise hia power of 
pardon under Art ic le 72 having a l l information which he needs 
in the ins tan t case . I t i s also pointed out that the 
Pres ident i s not bound by the decision of Supreme Court while 
disposing of the pe t i t ion under Art ic le 72. So fa r as the 
time l imi t i s concern i t i s ne i ther des i rable nor advisable 
to prescr ibe any time l imit for the disposal of pe t i t ion by 
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the President of India under Ar t ic le 72. However, i t i s 
necesaary that President should take expeditious steps to 
dispose of the pet i t ion under Art ic le 72 so that convict 
should not be made to suffer pain in the condemned c e l l . The 
f a t e of the convict should be known to him as ear ly as 
possibleo 
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